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Investor preference for director characteristics: Portfolio choice 
with gender bias 
 
Abstract 
This study examines whether investor-level preferences for director characteristics influence 
portfolio choices, using data on the U.S. holdings of non-U.S. funds. Consistent with bias-based 
preferences influencing portfolio allocations, funds from countries with greater gender inequality 
invest less and hold smaller stakes in firms with more female directors. Since variation in funds’ 
home-country gender biases are plausibly unrelated to the selection and performance of female 
directors in U.S. firms, the empirical strategy mitigates endogeneity concerns arising from 
estimates based on associations between market performance and gender demographics. The study 
contributes by linking investments to measured gender biases, and by providing evidence, through 
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This paper investigates whether investor-level preferences over director characteristics can 
influence portfolio decisions. While economic reasons might drive preferences, this paper focuses 
specifically on whether behavioral biases can lead to preferences over easily-observable director 
traits. To isolate a behavioral influence, I examine whether investors who are expected to have 
greater gender biases against women display a preference in their portfolio holdings for more male-
dominated boards and react more negatively to increases in board gender diversity.1 Overall, I find 
evidence consistent with investment choices being influenced by gender biases.  
Theoretically, gender biases can reduce investors’ portfolio allocations to firms with more 
women in leadership positions (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Existing studies tend to focus on 
the average associations between board gender demographics and investors’ choices (e.g., Dobbin 
and Jung, 2011). Such average associations, however, are sensitive to confounds at the director, 
firm, or investor levels, including investors making portfolio decisions based on differences 
between male and female board members that are difficult for researchers to measure.  
This study tests for bias-driven investor preference by exploiting data on non-U.S. funds’ 
holdings of U.S. equity. The focus on non-U.S. funds provides two primary benefits. First, it allows 
for an explicit proxy for gender biases at the investor (i.e., fund) level.2 Funds domiciled in 
countries with greater gender inequality are expected to have greater gender bias, and foreign 
                                                 
 
1 The importance of examining investor biases is highlighted by the mixed evidence on the relation between 
firms’ capital market performance and board gender diversity (Abdullah et al., 2016; Rhode and Packel, 
2010). Beyond capital markets research, gender biases and stereotypes reflecting explicit or implicit biases 
against women affect economic outcomes in several domains including labor, education, politics, and health 
(Glick et al., 2000; Goldin and Rouse, 2000; Guiso et al., 2008; Inci et al., 2017; Nosek et al., 2009; Reuben 
et al., 2014; Sigelman et al., 1982; UNDP, 2011).   
2 The use of local characteristics as proxies for investor or managerial characteristics is ubiquitous in the 
vast literature on the effects of culture on economic activity (e.g., Guiso et al., 2009; Kumar, 2009). 
Construct validity of the proxy for gender biases used herein is explicitly examined in Section III. 
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funds’ gender biases are plausibly exogenous to the selection and performance of female directors 
in U.S. public firms.3 Second, the focus on the role of funds’ local biases allows inference to be 
based on how portfolio choices involving the same set of firms vary across different types of 
investors. While differences in director skillsets can explain average investor reactions in the 
absence of gender biases, such differences would not explain why investor reactions to female 
board members would co-vary with cross-sectional proxies for investor bias. This empirical 
strategy therefore avoids several types of confounds related to directors’ influence on performance 
or firm risk and the selection of corporate leaders based on factors unobservable to researchers. 
Panel data furthermore allows for identification based on time-series variation independent of firm, 
fund, and firm-fund pair effects. 
The main empirical tests provide evidence of gender-biased portfolio tilting, whereby 
funds from more gender-biased countries tend to hold firms that have (proportionally) fewer 
female directors and react more negatively to increases in female board representation. These 
results are robust to controls for several factors that could influence funds’ portfolio choices and 
firms’ selection of directors, including features of the fund’s home country as well as firm risk, 
stock liquidity, return momentum, director independence and age, industry and S&P index 
membership, firm and fund size, and country and year fixed effects. The inferences from tests 
involving heterogeneous reactions to changes in female board representation are robust to potential 
                                                 
 
3 The empirical focus is on funds’ preferences for women on the board of directors. Although biased 
investors can also be deterred by a female CEO, the low prevalence of female CEOs in the sample limits 
the power of statistical tests focusing on this proxy. Only about 1 to 3 percent of sample firms per year have 
a female CEO, while there is considerable variation in the fraction of female directors in every year. See 
Wolfers (2006) for a discussion of the statistical power problem related to empirical research on female 
CEOs. Unreported tests replacing the independent variable, fraction of female directors, with an indicator 
for female CEO yield coefficients of interest that are not statistically significantly different from zero.  
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sources of endogeneity related to time-invariant properties of firms and funds, including the 
potential for funds from gender-biased countries to prefer industries with lower female board 
representation for reasons other than gender bias (e.g., correlated preferences for extractive 
industries which have few female directors). Further note that reverse causality is highly unlikely, 
as this would require U.S. board's gender demographics to have a measurable impact on the cross-
section of country-level gender inequality. Regarding omitted variables bias, identification relies 
on cross-sectional variation in the revealed preference for female directors, so a confounding 
correlated omitted variable would need to explain similar cross-country conditional variation in 
the association between female directors and funds' portfolio choices above and beyond the 
extensive set of controls. 
The main result is robust and statistically significant, but the economic significance of the 
association between gender bias and portfolio choice is modest. For a firm that increased the 
fraction of women on the board by ten percent, funds from a country at the 75th percentile of the 
gender bias measure are expected to reduce their exposure to the firm (i.e., fraction of the fund’s 
portfolio held in that firm) by 8 basis points more than funds from a country with a 25th-percentile 
gender bias score. This is roughly 20 (1.4) percent of the mean (standard deviation) change in 
exposure. The modest effect size is reassuring, as a large effect of gender biases on portfolio choice 
would be implausible in a mutual fund market where funds compete primarily on prior 
performance (Sirri and Tufano, 1998). While modest, the magnitude of the effect of gender bias 
on portfolio choice is on the order of the estimated effect of board independence on funds’ portfolio 
choices. 
Additional analyses examine potential channels and mechanisms. Funds expected to be 
more gender biased manifest a preference for (against) firms with 0 or 1 (2 or 3+) women on the 
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board. Allowing the effect to depend on the transition from X to Y board members, more gender-
biased funds react negatively to the number of female board members increasing from 1 to 2 and 
from 3 to 4. The move from 1 to 2 may be significant as a departure from tokenism, while the 
importance of the move from 3 to 4 may reflect the potential formation of a bloc of female directors 
(Van Peteghem et al., 2018). Tests for effect heterogeneity show that funds from countries where 
men and women hold more different preferences (e.g., for reciprocity, risk-taking, or patience) 
manifest stronger effects of gender biases, while funds from countries that are geographically and 
linguistically closer to the U.S. show weaker gender bias effects. These results are consistent with 
the main effect being driven by statistical discrimination, which involves the extrapolation of 
group characteristics to group members when there is limited information about the efficacy or 
productivity of individuals. 
The primary contribution of the paper is providing evidence on the potential for investor-
level preferences for director characteristics, rooted in behavioral biases, to influence portfolio 
choices. Additionally, this study contributes to the extensive literature on the capital market effects 
of board gender diversity, discussed in greater detail in the next section.  
II. BACKGROUND, RELATED STUDIES, AND METHODOLOGY 
Theoretical background and potential channels 
Gender biases reflect attitudes or beliefs, such as negative stereotypes, that may be explicit 
or implicit and manifest in preferences. Explicit attitudes operate consciously, while implicit 
attitudes operate subconsciously (Greenwald and Banaji, 1995; Wilson et al., 2000). Investors 
(e.g., fund managers) who are biased against women in leadership positions are expected to hold 
less of their portfolios in firms with more women on the board and reduce their holdings when the 
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fraction or number of women on the board increases. I refer to these phenomena as gender-biased 
portfolio tilting.4 
Investor-level gender bias can be founded upon either taste-based or statistical 
discrimination, both of which may have cultural roots.5 Taste-based discrimination, i.e., a dislike 
of women in certain positions, would directly cause a preference against female directors. 
Statistical discrimination can have the same effect but operates through lower expectations about 
the efficacy of female directors, which in turn lower expectations about future firm performance.6 
Statistical discrimination manifests more strongly when there is less information about the 
productivity or efficacy of individuals. Lee and James (2007) suggest, based on the literature on 
schemas (e.g., Perry et al., 1994), that observations of gender inequality likely reinforce 
stereotypes, including attitudes that women are less qualified for directorships than men. 
The low prevalence of female corporate leaders and the complexity of the work directors 
do jointly inhibit investors’ and researchers’ ability to learn about female efficacy in the board 
room (Joshi et al., 2015b). Furthermore, empirical evidence on the effects of board gender diversity 
on firm performance is generally mixed (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Rhode and Packel, 2010). 
The difficulty of estimation can cause fund managers to rely more on their prior beliefs, which 
could include gender biases based on locally-observed inequality.  
                                                 
 
4 The analysis focuses on fund-level gender biases. Additional analyses available from the author suggest 
that funds’ investors’ preferences are unlikely to be drivers of funds’ biased portfolio strategies.  
5 Several studies provide survey-based evidence consistent with biases against women in leadership 
positions (Dubno, 1985; Powell and Butterfield, 1979; Powell et al., 2002). See Darity and Mason (1998) 
for an overview of common models of discrimination, focusing on drivers of wage differentials. See Alesina 
et al. (2013) for analysis of potential origins of cultural gender bias dating back to the dawn of civilization, 
as well as a discussion of reasons for their persistence.   
6 Bias in this study refers to attitudes, beliefs, and preferences, consistent with the literature on gender 
biases. In behavioral economics, bias often is used as a contrast to unbiased, rational beliefs or actions. 
Irrationality as in behavioral economics is not a precondition for gender bias, as statistical discrimination 
may reflect biases that are conditionally rational based on an individual’s constrained set of observations. 
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Gender biases are plausibly prevalent in the asset management industry. Across 56 
countries, only about 20% of funds have a female manager (Sargis and Lutton, 2016). In a survey 
conducted by the Financial Times in late 2017, about a third of women working in asset 
management indicated they had experienced workplace sexual harassment, and over two thirds of 
respondents reported experiencing sexist behavior in the office (Mooney and Smith, 2017).  
The gender biases and stereotypes held by fund managers are expected to depend on local 
conditions. Simply put, fund managers in environments with greater gender inequality, or in 
cultures characterized by stronger gender biases and stereotypes, will hold beliefs that tend towards 
those of their surroundings, consistent with the formation of attitudes based on observed gender 
roles, authority or status differences, and stereotypes (Rudman and Kilianski, 2000).7 Analyses 
supporting this assumption are presented in Section III. Fund managers from countries with greater 
gender inequality, as a manifestation of cultural gender biases, are expected to engage in more 
biased portfolio tilting.  
Related studies 
Extant research has found suggestive evidence consistent with investors’ gender biases 
interacting with board gender diversity to influence investment choices. Dobbin and Jung (2011) 
analyze associations between female directors and firm value (measured via Tobin’s Q), 
accounting performance, and ownership. In their ownership-related tests, the dependent variable 
is the fraction of the firm owned by a certain type of professional investor (blockholders, banks, 
insurance companies, investment advisors, and public pensions). The number of female directors 
                                                 
 
7 This is consistent with prior studies that take country-level survey averages or aggregates (e.g., religious 
affiliation) as proxies for investor characteristics (e.g., Guiso et al., 2009; Kumar, 2009). While the fund 
manager’s nationality is not observed broadly in the data, the maintained assumption is also consistent with 
funds hiring managers who are, on average, culturally similar to locals. 
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is positively associated with blockholder ownership and negatively associated with some kinds of 
non-blockholder ownership. They interpret this as reflecting blockholders’ apprehension to be held 
accountable for gender-biased portfolio choices. However, their effect may also be driven by 
blockholders’ potential influence on the selection of directors. 
Post and Byron (2015), in a meta-analysis, find a positive association between board 
diversity and accounting performance, but a negative association between diversity and market 
performance in countries with high gender inequality. However, Post and Byron (2015) focus on 
domestic, within-country investment, which does not hold the firms and directors constant, 
meaning that effects attributed to investors’ gender bias may be confounded by variation in the 
sample of firms and directors (i.e., differences in firms’ home-country contextual environments). 
The identification strategy in this study, by exploiting gender inequality in foreign funds’ home 
countries and focusing on only their U.S. holdings, provides a mechanism for linking gender bias 
explicitly to funds’ portfolios, whereby funds that are plausibly more gender-biased tend to react 
more negatively to board diversity and the sample of firms is consistent across funds. 
Ahern and Dittmar (2012) examine the value effects of a Norwegian law mandating that at 
least 40 percent of board members be female.8 Firms with lower female board representation 
before the passage of the law saw a greater decline in value, although this is attributed to constraints 
on the pool of directors rather than director gender, as the new post-mandate female board 
members differed along several dimensions from the males they replaced. The authors “are careful 
to note that our setting does not allow us to separately identify the causal effect of age, experience, 
                                                 
 
8 Studies using quotas often exploit changes in the number or fraction of female directors, which is a 




or gender on firm value.” Furthermore, Eckbo et al. (2014) dispute the results and inference from 
Ahern and Dittmar (2012).  
 A concurrent paper by Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi (2018) provides additional evidence for 
investor bias influencing portfolio choice. They find that mutual funds managed by women 
experience lower retail inflows than those managed by men, consistent with gender biases against 
female fund managers. In a confirmatory laboratory experiment, they find that participants who 
display bias in an implicit association test tend to invest less in funds with female managers than 
in funds with male managers. Their findings are consistent with the findings in this study, although 
they focus on retail investors and laboratory participants potentially more susceptible to biases. 
Overall, they provide corroboration in an alternative setting for this study’s results on the potential 
effects of gender biases on even professional investors’ portfolio choices.  
Research methodology 
The theory implies that more gender-biased investors will tend to allocate a lower fraction 
of their portfolio to firms with greater female board representation. I test this hypothesis using 
panel data on non-U.S. funds’ holdings of U.S. public equity. First, I examine whether funds 
expected to be more gender-biased tend to hold portfolios with less female board representation 
on average. In these regressions, the dependent variable is a value-weighted average of the fraction 
of women on the boards of firms held by the fund and the independent variable of interest is the 
fund’s home-country gender bias. Identification in these tests comes from cross-country variation. 
In the second type of specification, I test whether funds from more gender biased countries react 
more negatively to increases in female board representation. In these tests, the dependent variable 
is the fraction of the fund’s U.S. portfolio allocated to a given firm and the independent variable 
of interest is the interaction between the fund’s home-country gender bias and the change in the 
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fraction of women on the portfolio firm’s board. An alternative specification replaces the fund’s 
home-country gender bias measure with a lagged revealed-preference measure at the fund-time 
level. Additional analyses examine potential mechanisms using alternative variable definitions and 
cross-sectional analyses. In all specifications, the relevant decision maker is taken to be the fund 
manager, who chooses which firms to hold in the fund’s portfolio. 
A central concern is that board gender diversity might be associated with an aspect of real 
firm activity that is associated with a dimension of fund preferences that is distinct from but 
correlated with gender biases. Prior evidence suggests board gender diversity is associated with 
greater monitoring of executives (Adams and Ferreira, 2009), more informative stock prices (Gul 
et al., 2011), a lower probability and severity of securities fraud (Cumming et al., 2015), and more 
active boards (Schwartz-Ziv, 2017).9 Inci et al. (2017) provide evidence consistent with female 
executives having less access to valuable inside information. Overall, the evidence linking board 
gender diversity to firm performance is mixed (Abdullah et al., 2016; Rhode and Packel, 2010; 
Van Peteghem et al., 2018). The use of multiple specifications with controls for confounding 
channels, along with corroborating cross-sectional evidence, mitigates concerns about these 
confounds. 
                                                 
 
9 Schwartz-Ziv (2017), in a sample of 11 Israeli companies with significant government ownership, finds 
that boards with at least 3 directors and gender-balanced boards behave differently, on average, from other 
boards. The average fraction of female directors in her sample is 37%. For the firm-years appearing in the 
sample used here, only 4.75% have 3 directors and about 1.6% have more than 3 directors. 
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III. SAMPLE, DATA, AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Sample and data 
Fund holdings are taken from Thomson Financial’s S12 dataset (formerly CDA/Spectrum), 
which provides information on funds’ long positions in U.S.-listed common equity.10 Schwarz and 
Potter (2015) describe disclosure requirements for mutual funds and the construction of the S12 
database, which is built from SEC filings (e.g., N-30D, N-CSR, N-Q, and 13F) and voluntary 
portfolio disclosures to Thomson or Thomson’s predecessor, CDA. Funds’ portfolio choices are 
captured by FRACHELDi,j,t = HELDi,j,t/TOTALHELDi,t, where HELDi,j,t is the reported dollar 
holdings of fund i in firm j at a reporting date t and TOTALHELDi,t is the sum of HELDi,j,t over all 
firms, j, that appear on a particular filing (indexed by i,t).11 NHELDi,t is the number of firms 
reported by the fund on a given filing with the SEC, and INVHELDi,t is 1/NHELDi,t. SUMHELDi,t 
is the log of the total value of all reported holdings for fund i on the date-t filing. 
Firm-specific director data is taken from RiskMetrics. RiskMetrics data is matched with 
fund reporting dates by taking firm information reported from the most recent annual meeting 
preceding the fund’s reporting date. (#)FEMDIRj,t is the (number) fraction of board seats at firm j 
held by women at time t.12 INDDIRj,t is fraction of board seats held by independent directors. 
                                                 
 
10 The focus on non-U.S. funds is based on the need to infer gender biases from local conditions, where 
gender-bias data is available and varies considerably at the country level. The focus on U.S. public equity 
holdings is based on the availability of data on firms’ boards’ gender demographics and the limitation that 
the Thomson Financial S12 dataset is based on filings with the SEC that cover only U.S. holdings. An 
advantage of focusing only on U.S. firms is that it holds the contextual environment of the held firms 
constant in the cross-section. Specifically, the study avoids issues related to cross-country heterogeneity in 
firms’ institutional environments (e.g., board members’ responsibilities and liability) and labor markets for 
female board members. 
11 Changes in holdings arising from liquidating trades or initiations of positions are used in the analyses. 
12 Observations where the “female” indicator in RiskMetrics is missing are assumed to be male directors. 
Based on a random sample, the vast majority of directors with a missing “female” indicator have male first 
names. Dropping the observations with missing female indicators does not change the inferences. 
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NDIRj,t is the number of directors on the firm’s board, and is the denominator in the calculations 
of FEMDIRj,t and INDDIRj,t. Fund-level revealed preferences for various firm-level characteristics 
are captured from each fund-report. The postscript “_FP” is used for these, and they are calculated 
as value-weighted averages. For instance, 𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑅_𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 =
∑    (𝐻𝐸𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑗,𝑡∗𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑗,𝑡)
∑ 𝐻𝐸𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
, which equals 
∑ (𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝐻𝐸𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑗,𝑡)𝑗  
The main proxy for fund-level gender bias, GIk, is the UN Gender Inequality Index for the 
fund’s home country, k, with the value taken from the 2011 UN Human Development report 
(HDR).13 Funds are matched with countries based on the S12 “Country” variable. The location of 
the fund is used, as nationalities of individual fund managers are not generally available.14 GI is 
based on several country-level indicators, and ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating 
greater inequality.15 
 GI is constructed from indicators for gender bias reflecting female empowerment 
(educational attainment and participation in parliament), labor market conditions (labor force 
participation), and development (maternal mortality and adolescent fertility). Several prior studies 
construct gender inequality indicators based on the empowerment and labor market indicators 
                                                 
 
13 GI from a single year is used, rather than a time-series of GI for each country, as gender inequality is a 
slow-moving process (e.g., Alesina et al., 2013), suggesting that GI in one year is representative of GI 
across several years. In unreported analysis using a constructed time-series of GI values – constructed 
because the GI began to be reported only in 2010 – within-country GI has a first-order autocorrelation 
coefficient of 0.999. The constructed time series of GI is based on the algorithm described in the technical 
notes of the 2013 UN Human Development Report (see also Gaye et al. (2010)) with data available from 
the World Bank Global Development Indicators. Data availability is inconsistent across country-years, 
leading to several country-years for which the GI cannot be constructed.  
14 WRDS documentation and the author’s examination of a sample of funds is consistent with the Country 
variable in S12 representing the location of the fund manager. See the “Construct validity of GI” subsection 
below for further analysis and discussion. 
15 Details on construction of the GI can be found in the technical appendix of the 2011 UN Human 
Development Report available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-report-2011, 
accessed December 27, 2013. The GI was introduced in 2010. 
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(e.g., Glick et al., 2000). Gaye et al. (2010), discussing GI in depth, argue that GI is superior to 
several of these alternative composite measures of gender inequality due to GI’s synthesis of 
empowerment and development indices. Gaye et al. (2010) specifically suggest that development 
indicators, like maternal mortality, reflect important economic and social facets of gender 
inequality, signaling women’s status in society. 
Control variables are included based on factors that could be related to country-level 
cultural beliefs (e.g., Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2016), female directorships (e.g., Hillman et al., 
2007), and fund ownership determinants (e.g., Gompers and Metrick, 2001). Country-level proxies 
for other cultural and institutional attributes include Hofstede’s six National Culture dimensions: 
Power Distance, Individuality, Masculinity, Long-term Orientation, Indulgence, and Uncertainty 
Avoidance. Corruption and Religion in Politics are the similarly-named indices from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). To capture local familiarity with female directors, 
FracFemDirCY is the country-year average fraction of female directors on boards of firms located 
in the fund’s home country, taken from Schmid and Urban (2013). Legal system indicators are 
taken from JuriGlobe. Controls from the World Bank (WB) for each fund’s local macroeconomic 
conditions are: Log per capita GDP (in U.S. dollars); Net FDI as % of GDP (net foreign direct 
investment, inflows minus outflows, divided by GDP); Gini coefficient; and Log population. 
As the analyses focuses on holdings of U.S. firms, several proxies for familiarity and 
similarity with U.S. boards, board members, and culture are included. Local directors from U.S. is 
the fraction of foreign directors of corporate boards in the fund’s home country who are from the 
United States, based on Barrios et al. (2017).  Directors in U.S. is the number of U.S. corporate 
directors from the fund’s home country reported in Barrios et al. (2017). These proxies capture 
familiarity with U.S. boards and board members. Common language with U.S. is the linguistic 
13 
 
commonality between the fund’s home country and the U.S., based on the Melitz and Toubal 
(2014) Common Language measure. Log distance from U.S. is the log of the geographic distance 
from the fund’s home country to the U.S. as provided by Melitz and Toubal (2014). Genetic 
distance from U.S. is the Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) weighted FST genetic distance between 
the fund’s home country and the U.S. Religious distance from U.S. is the Fearon weighted religious 
distance of the fund’s home country from the U.S. provided by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016). 
Log trade with U.S. is the log of total trade between the fund’s home country and the U.S. from 
1998 to 2007, from Melitz and Toubal (2014). Log migrants in (from) U.S. is the log of the stock 
of migrants from (in) the fund’s home country in (from) the U.S. in 2010 taken from the U.N. 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division.  
Controls for firm characteristics include the following. BOOK is the log of the book value 
of common equity (Compustat item CEQQ reported during the calendar quarter prior to the fund 
report date). Market-based measures are taken from CRSP, unless otherwise indicated. BETA is 
the CAPM beta from a regression of the firm’s returns on the CRSP value-weighted market 
portfolio using the 24 (at least 12) full months preceding the fund report date. DIVY is the annual 
dividend yield based on the most recent four quarters before the fund report date. YMOM is the 
cumulative annual security return (i.e., yearly momentum) for the 12 months preceding the fund 
report date. QMOMx is the cumulative return for the x quarters prior to the fund report (i.e., 
QMOM1 captures quarterly momentum).  TURN is share turnover (shares traded divided by shares 
outstanding) in the three months preceding the report.  ILLIQ is Amihud (2002) illiquidity, 
calculated as the average log of daily absolute ex-dividend returns times 106 divided by dollar 
volume for the three months preceding the fund report. RETVAR is the variance of monthly returns 
for the 24 (at least 12) months preceding the fund report date. MARKET is the log market value of 
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the firm based on the report filed by the fund. Indicators for S&P index membership (S&P 500, 
S&P Midcap, S&P Smallcap) and 2-digit historical NAICS industry codes are taken from 
Compustat.  
To eliminate funds in which fund managers are likely to be indexing or quasi-indexing, 
observations from filings that report more than 100 distinct stocks are eliminated from the sample. 
This admittedly ad-hoc selection criterion is meant to increase the statistical power of the 
regression tests by narrowing the sample to funds in which individual managers plausibly make 
portfolio decisions based on observable firm characteristics rather than through a formulaic 
investing strategy.16 Managers of these funds are arguably more likely to look at portfolio firms’ 
annual proxy statements and thereby observe the names of firms’ directors, where director gender 
is plausibly indicated by first name. Robustness checks verify that results are not sensitive to the 
cutoff at 100 portfolio firms.  
Construct validity of GI 
Construct validity of GI relies on the assumption that fund managers inherit preferences 
and beliefs consistent with those of the fund’s home country.17 This type of assumption is common 
to a large literature on the influence of cultural beliefs and preferences on economic choices (e.g., 
Guiso et al., 2009). I estimate two statistics to support the assumption here. The first is the 
probability that an individual fund manager comes from the same country as the fund. The second 
is the cross-country correlation between gender biases held by the general populace and by 
professionals/managers in the same country. Jointly, these statistics help address the question of 
                                                 
 
16 The Investment Objective Code in S12 is either missing or “Unclassified” for over 94.6 percent of the 
observations, so it is not used in the analysis. 
17 Less than three percent of the sample observations come from multi-country fund families. 
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whether professional fund managers’ beliefs can be expected to be reflected by the average beliefs 
in each fund’s home country. 
The main sample is comprised of over 15,000 unique non-U.S. funds. To check whether 
fund managers come from their fund’s home country, a sample of fund manager nationalities was 
hand-collected for a country-stratified random sample of approximately 100 funds appearing in 
the data in 2010 or 2011.18 For the 75 funds with fund managers whose nationality could be 
inferred from online sources, 62 were from the same country, representing approximately 83 
percent of the 75 non-missing observations. The 95% confidence interval for the probability of a 
match is (0.72,0.90). This suggests a high likelihood that fund managers’ cultural backgrounds are 
reflected in the fund’s home country data item.19  
The second question central to construct validity of GI is whether professional fund 
managers from a given country share the average beliefs of their compatriots. The World Values 
Survey (WVS) provides data on beliefs from respondents from a wide array of countries and 
collects information on respondents’ occupational categories. Gender biases are captured by 
responses to the following two statements: 1) Men make better political leaders than women do; 
and 2) On the whole, men make better business executives than women do. Answers to each were 
coded as: 0 = strongly disagree; 0.33 = disagree; 0.67 = agree; 1 = agree strongly. The WVS 
                                                 
 
18 The fund manager found online is the fund manager as of data collection in September 2018. Although 
these are not necessarily the fund managers in 2010 or 2011, they nonetheless represent observations of 
individual fund managers whose cultural background can be checked and compared to the fund’s domicile 
as listed in the dataset. Estimates of nationalities came either from articles about the fund manager, Linkedin 
pages, Facebook pages, or online profiles either at the fund’s web page or from data providers such as 
Bloomberg or Morningstar. Google translate facilitated the reading of non-English pages. The hand-
collected sample is available from the author. 
19 That the vast majority of fund managers are local is consistent with Kumar et al. (2015), who find that 
5.3 percent of U.S. mutual fund managers have “foreign-sounding” names. 
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provides broad respondent occupational categories that allow for differentiation between 
professionals/managers and others (e.g., middle level non-managers, small business owners, 
manual laborers, farmers, and unemployed persons). I calculated the average country-level 
responses to the gender bias questions, both at the country-level for all respondents, denoted 
GenderBias_WVS, and separately for only 3 occupational categories representing professionals or 
managers (Employer/manager of establishment with 10 or more employed; Professional worker; 
and Supervisory Non-manual office worker), denoted GenderBias_WVS_Professional. In the 
cross-section of countries, the Pearson and Spearman correlations between GenderBias_WVS and 
GenderBias_WVS_Professional are both over 97%. This high correlation between the beliefs of 
professionals/managers and broader country-level averages suggests that professionals and 
managers have similar beliefs to their compatriots on average.20 
Overall, the two correlations discussed above suggest that professional fund managers’ 
beliefs are plausibly aligned with aggregate beliefs in their home countries. This is reflected in the 
high correlations both between fund-manager background and fund domicile, and between WVS-
elicited beliefs between compatriot respondents with different degrees of professional 
employment. This supports the construct validity of GI as a measure of fund-level gender bias and 
the observation of Guiso et al. (2009), “that cultural effects are not limited to unsophisticated 
consumers, but are also present among sophisticated professionals such as mutual fund managers.”  
                                                 
 
20 GI is also significantly negatively associated with the home-country fraction of female directors, taken 




Table 1.A shows, by country, the number of fund-firm-report observations and the means 
of the main variables.21 The main sample is built from the intersection of the Thomson S12 fund 
holdings data and the RiskMetrics director data, as described above. The sample for the main 
analysis includes approximately two million fund-firm-time observations (in changes) from 
approximately 18,000 funds with NHELD ≤ 100 in the 1998-2011 period. Each observation, 
before aggregation, is a reported holding by a fund in a portfolio firm on a report filed by the fund 
at a point in time (i.e., fund-firm-time). Some analyses aggregate observations by fund-report or 
by fund home country. Table 1.B reports the means, medians, and Pearson correlations of country-
level means and medians for the 42 countries in the sample.  
Table 2.A and 2.B provide additional descriptive statistics and correlations. In Table 2.A, 
the unit of observation is the fund-report, or fund-time. There are approximately 156,000 fund 
reports in the sample. The mean value of FEMDIR_FPi,t is 0.14, indicating that the value-weighted 
fraction of female directors for sample fund-time observations is 14 percent. FEMDIR_FPi,t has a 
modest but statistically significant negative correlation with GIk, providing univariate support for 
the hypothesis that gender bias is associated with portfolio choice. 
Figure 1 presents further graphical evidence to support the main hypothesis. It plots the 
fraction of fund-time observations from below-median and above-median GI countries falling into 
each decile of sample-wide FEMDIR_FP.22 Random assignment would imply roughly 10 percent 
for each decile bin for both above- and below-median GI countries. However, in the countries with 
                                                 
 
21 The large number of observations associated with Spain may be attributable to European Union 
integration and tax incentives for companies in Spanish territories (Canary and Balearic Islands). 
22 The split is at GI = 0.15. Roughly 80 percent of the sample fund-time observations come from the 21 
below-median GI countries. 
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below-median GI, the fraction of sample observations is increasing slightly in the FEMDIR_FP 
decile, from about 9.57 up to 10.85 percent. In contrast, for countries with above-median GI, the 
fraction of fund-years is decreasing in the FEMDIR_FP decile, from about 11.82 down to 6.45 
percent. Overall, this suggests that funds from countries with greater gender bias are more likely 
to show revealed preferences against female directors at portfolio firms.  
Table 2.B provides descriptive statistics and correlations for the differenced variables used 
in the fund-firm-time analysis in changes. The “_dif” suffix is appended to denote a changes 
variable. The mean change in FRACHELD is 0.004, and there is a modest increasing trend in the 
fraction of women on boards, indicated by the mean FEMDIR_dif of 0.005. 
Nearly all of the correlations in Table 2 are statistically significant. The correlations do not 
correct for serial or cross-sectional dependence, as the regressions do, and should be interpreted 
accordingly. In Table 2.B, the change in the fraction of a fund held in a given firm 
(FRACHELD_dif) is positively correlated with changes in the fraction and number of female 
directors, the independence, mean age, and number of directors, and firm size. FRACHELD_dif is 
negatively correlated with changes in the CAPM beta, return variance, dividend yield and 
illiquidity. FEMDIR_dif is correlated with more independent and younger directors, growing 
firms, and shrinking boards. Consistent with Adams and Ferreira (2006) and Cumming et al. 
(2015), FEMDIR_dif is negatively associated with changes in risk measures including BETA_dif 
and RETVAR_dif.  FEMDIR_dif is also positively (negatively) correlated with changes in the 
dividend yield and turnover (illiquidity). These correlations emphasize the value of controlling for 
potential confounds correlated both with fund preferences and the fraction of female directors. 
IV. RESULTS 
Fund portfolio-level analysis 
The first set of analyses involve estimates of the regression: 
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𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑅_𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐺𝐼𝑘 + ∑ 𝛿𝑋 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑋
𝑋
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
  
where subscripts i, t, and k refer to holding fund, date, and fund home country, respectively. 
FEMDIR_FPi,t, and GIk are defined above. CONTROLX represents a set of controls. Specifications 
with five different sets of controls are presented in Table 3. Variables followed by “_FP” in the 
table indicate fund-time revealed preferences for company-level characteristics, calculated as 
∑ 𝑋𝑗,𝑡∗𝐻𝐸𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑗
∑ 𝐻𝐸𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑗
 where Xj,t is the appropriate measure for the portfolio firm j at time t. Standard errors 
in each specification are clustered by country to allow for correlation between compatriot 
observations, which allows for correlated errors across funds and time. Column 1 includes only 
year indicators to account for the secular trend in female directors. The association between GI 
and FEMDIR_FP is negative and statistically significant (𝛽 = −0.036, 𝑝 < 0.05), indicating that 
funds from more gender-biased countries tilt their portfolios away from firms with greater female 
board representation. 
 The specification in Column 2 adds controls for linguistic, genetic, and religious similarity 
with the U.S., geographic distance from the U.S., trade with the U.S., macroeconomic 
development, foreign direct investment, economic inequality, population, and migrant stock from 
and in the U.S.; portfolio-revealed fund preferences for independent directors, director age, firm 
size, valuation, and risk, payout policy, liquidity, momentum, and board size; the number of firms 
held; and indicators for the fund home country’s legal origin and continent. Due to the slow-
moving nature of cultural beliefs and preferences, a country-level proxy for gender bias is used, 
which precludes the inclusion of country fixed effects – hence the extensive set of country-level 
control variables. Inclusion of these controls reduces the number of observations to 69,161, but 
increases the R2 from 0.16 in column 1 to 0.39 in column 2. With these controls included, the 
coefficient on GI increases in magnitude and significance, to −0.058 (𝑝 < 0.01). 
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 Columns 3, 4, and 5 build on column 2 with additional controls related to culture, 
institutional characteristics, and country-level director characteristics related to gender and U.S. 
ties. Except for the institutional characteristics, none of these is significantly associated with 
FEMDIR_FP in the presence of the other controls.  Furthermore, the coefficient on GI remains 
negative (ranging from −0.068 to −0.075) and significant at the one percent level. 
 Regarding economic magnitude, the coefficients in Table 3 can be interpreted as follows. 
The cross-country interquartile range of GI is 0.18 = 0.286 − 0.106. An increase in GI from the 
25th percentile of countries to the 75th percentile of countries is associated with a reduction in the 
value-weighted fraction of women on the board ranging from 65 to 134 basis points, e.g., 
−0.0065 = −0.0362 ∗ 0.18 for the smallest coefficient and −0.0134 = −0.0747 ∗ 0.18 for the 
largest. This is 4.7 to 9.6 percent of the mean value of FEMDIR_FP and 13 to 27 percent of the 
sample standard deviation of FEMDIR_FP. The average fund report lists approximately 26 U.S. 
firms held, and the average NDIR_FP is 11.5, implying an average of 300 possibly overlapping 
directors in the average foreign fund’s U.S. portfolio, of which approximately a mean of 42 (14%) 
are women. Decreasing FEMDIR_FP by 65 to 135 basis points would imply 2 to 4 fewer female 
directors in the fund’s portfolio. From a portfolio perspective, this could mean holding a couple 
firms with no female directors in lieu of firms with 1 to 2 female directors.23 While modest at the 
fund portfolio level, aggregation across thousands of funds and firms could yield large economy-
wide effects. Furthermore, note that the economic effects of gender biases for funds that seek to 
maximize returns or risk-adjusted returns should be exactly zero, or, at least should not vary with 
                                                 
 
23 Of the 65 percent of sample firms with female directors, over 90 percent have only one or two.   
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country-level gender bias. That the estimates are significantly different from zero suggests a role 
for bias in the portfolio choices of professional fund managers. 
 The fact that several control variables are associated with FEMDIR_FP is suggestive of 
the potential for unobservable country-level features to create endogeneity biases due to 
correlation with fund’s preferences for or against firms that have greater female board 
representation. To address this endogeneity concern, I move to analyses focusing on changes in 
the fund’s portfolio composition, i.e., with fund-firm-time as the unit of analysis. 
Analysis of changes in funds’ portfolio composition 
The first set of changes analyses focus on how GI affects the relation between changes in 
the fraction of women on corporate boards and changes in each fund’s portfolio allocation 
decisions. These specifications include firm-level controls that mitigate issues related to changes 
in female board representation capturing differences in firm performance. The changes 
specification eliminates the potential for omitted variables at the fund, firm, or fund-firm pair level. 
For example, inferences from the changes specification would not be confounded by funds from 
less gender-biased countries preferring to hold firms from industries that tend to have more female 
directors, for whatever reason.  
Variants of the following regression equation are estimated:  
𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝐻𝐸𝐿𝐷_𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑅_𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑅_𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝐼𝑘 
                                                                                                               + ∑ 𝛿𝑋 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑋
𝑋
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 (2) 
where subscripts i, j, t, and k refer to holding fund, held firm, date, and fund home country, 
FRACHELD_difi,j,t is the change in FRACHELDi,j,t for fund i in firm j from the fund’s previous 
filing (t-1) to its current one (t). Observations where the last filing was more than 5 quarters ago 
are dropped. The main coefficient of interest in Equation (2) is γ, the coefficient on the interaction 
between FEMDIR_difj,t  and GIk. The null hypothesis (γ = 0), is that funds’ average preferences 
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for female directors do not vary with local gender biases, while the alternative hypothesis (γ < 0), 
implies that funds from more biased countries react more negatively to increases in female board 
representation. 
Changes in the number of female board members are infrequent in the data. At the fund-
firm-report level, 85% of the observations with available data feature no change. The number of 
female board members increases by one in eight percent of the observations, and decreases by one 
in five percent of the observations. Changes in the fraction of female directors, FEMDIR_dif 
follow a similar distribution, as the 25th and 75th percentiles of the distribution of FEMDIR_dif are 
both zero. FEMDIR_dif takes non-integer values and has more non-zero values, as it is also 
affected by the more frequent board changes due to the addition or subtraction of male directors. 
Regressions in changes are presented in Table 4. Standard errors in these regressions are 
clustered at the fund level to allow for non-zero correlation of the residuals for all observations 
within the same fund. This adjusts for the persistence in holdings of a given security over time and 
for the cross-sectional effect of a firm selling one security on the fraction held in the remaining 
securities for a particular set of fund-quarter observations. All coefficient estimates and standard 
errors in Table 4 have been multiplied by 10,000 for presentation, although coefficients reported 
in parentheses in the text have not been similarly transformed. 
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, the model includes controls for changes in board age, board 
independence, firm size, risk, market exposure, momentum, and liquidity, as well as fixed effects 
for industry, year, and S&P index, which capture heterogeneous trends in the changes 
specifications. The coefficients in Models 1 and 2 of Table 4 on FEMDIR_dif*GI are negative and 
significant (−0.0503 and −0.0486, p < 0.01), supporting the hypothesis that investor-level gender 
biases influence portfolio choices. Columns 1 and 2 differ only in that column 1 includes the main 
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effect of GI, while column 2 includes country fixed effects. The country fixed effects allow for 
country-specific trends in FRACHELD. Interestingly, the main effects on FEMDIR_dif are about 
0.005 and statistically significant (p < 0.05), suggesting that foreign funds from low-GI countries 
tend to tilt their portfolios in favor of firms when the fraction of women on the board increases, 
but funds from more gender-biased countries tend to tilt less favorably and even tilt against. For 
example, the estimated total coefficient on FEMDIR_dif for a fund from Chile (GI = 0.374), based 
on column 2, is −0.01. Focusing on the total effects of a change in FEMDIR, funds from countries 
with gender inequality scores above (below) approximately 0.0051/0.049 = 0.10 tend to decrease 
(increase) their portfolio allocation in firms following an increase in the fraction of women on the 
board. 
Column 3 includes additional interactive controls to address potential alternative 
hypotheses and confounds. First, GI is a country-level proxy for gender biases, which could be 
associated with other factors including preferences for directors’ experience or independence. 
Funds in less-developed countries might wish to hold U.S. firms to gain exposure to the U.S. 
market and diversify home risks, in which case they would tilt their portfolios towards higher U.S. 
beta firms. Additionally, these funds could be further from the U.S. market, and as such desire 
board members who are more engaged in monitoring to reduce risks associated with being less 
able to closely monitor management. Based on the results of Adams and Ferreira (2009) and 
Cumming et al. (2015), funds from less-developed countries that happen to have higher gender 
inequality might prefer to invest in firms with women on the board to take advantage of female 
directors’ higher expected monitoring of management or lower propensity for risky activities. The 
increase in monitoring would plausibly be reflected in lower firm risk (Brick and Chidambaran, 
2008) or be further associated with the fraction of independent directors. Alternatively, firms with 
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more female directors might have a different risk profile due to heterogeneous risk preferences 
between male and female directors (Carter et al., 2016).  To address these potential confounds, the 
following variables are interacted with GI as additional controls: BETA_dif, RETVAR_dif, 
INDDIR_dif, and MEANAGE_dif.  
None of the coefficients on these interactions are statistically significant. The magnitude 
of the coefficient on FEMDIR_dif*GI is substantively unchanged with the inclusion of these 
additional controls, and remains statistically significant (-0.046, p < 0.01). Overall, results in Table 
4 consistently support the hypothesis that investors’ gender biases manifest in portfolio choices. 
Regarding economic significance, consider the estimated effect on changes in portfolio 
allocations of a female director replacing a male director on a 10-person board, for funds from the 
boundaries of the interquartile range of GI. Specifically, consider the difference in the effect of a 
0.10 value for FEMDIR_dif for a fund with GI equal to 0.106 (the 25th percentile of sample 
countries) compared to a fund with GI equal to 0.286 (the 75th percentile of sample countries). The 
difference in effects based on the coefficients estimated in column 3 is −0.046 ∗ 0.1 ∗ (0.286 −
0.106)  =  −0.0008, which is an eight basis point difference in the change in the fraction of the 
fund’s reported holdings invested in a given firm. This is about 20 (1.4) percent of the mean 
(standard deviation) of FRACHELD_dif. 
Table 5 replicates the analysis in Table 4, but with the country-level GI replaced by 
FEMDIR_FPi,t-1, which captures the fund’s revealed preference for female directors on its previous 
filing. Unlike GIk, FEMDIR_FPi,t-1 varies within country and across time, although, as shown in 
Table 3, variation in FEMDIR_FPi,t-1 may reflect factors other than gender biases. In the three 
models presented in Table 5, the coefficient on FEMDIR_difj,t * FEMDIR_FPi,t-1 is positive and 
significant at the one percent level (coefficients ranging from 0.269 to 0.282). This provides 
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consistent, supportive evidence in that funds that have a revealed historical preference for female 
directors tend to react more positively to increases in the fraction of female directors. 
Additional analyses  
This section presents additional analyses focused on channels or mechanisms through 
which gender biases might affect investment choices. Table 6 examines whether funds expected 
to be more gender biased seem to tilt their portfolios toward firms with fewer women on the board. 
Each column in Table 6 provides estimates from a modified version of Model 2 from Table 3, with 
the dependent variable replaced by Number of Female Directors Fund Preference (NFEMx_FP). 
NFEMx_FP is a fund’s revealed preference for firms with 0, 1, 2, or 3+ female directors for 
holdings reported at time t, defined as 𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑀𝑥_𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ 1𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑀𝑗,𝑡=𝑥∗𝐻𝐸𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑗,𝑡
∑ 𝐻𝐸𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑗,𝑡
 where i denotes fund, 
j denotes portfolio firm, t denotes time, NFEMxj,t is the number of female directors on firm j at 
time t, and HELDi,j,t is the fund’s dollar-denominated holdings in firm j on time t. Table 6 provides 
estimates with both GIk and FEMDIR_FPj,t-1 as independent variables of interest. The results in 
Table 6 suggest that funds expected to be more gender biased tend to manifest a preference for 
(against) firms with 0 or 1 (2 or 3+) women on the board.24 
Table 7 examines which types of changes in female board representation drive the earlier 
results from Table 4. Table 7 provides regression estimates of the 𝛾 coefficients from estimates of 
𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝐻𝐸𝐿𝐷_𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = ∑ 𝛾𝑋,𝑌 ∗ 1#𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑗,𝑡−1𝑋 ∗ 1#𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑅_𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑗,𝑡𝑌 ∗ 𝐺𝐼𝑘
𝑋,𝑌
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑍 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑍
𝑍
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 (3) 
                                                 
 
24 Note that FEMDIR_FP is mechanically related to NFEMx_FP – negatively for low x values and 
positively for high x values. Combined with persistence in funds’ holdings, this may influence coefficient 
estimates in columns five through eight of Table 6, although fund-clustered standard errors should correct 
for such within-fund correlation across time.  
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which is equation (2), with FEMDIR_difj,t replaced with the product of indicators for 
lag(#FEMDIR)X and #FEMDIR_difY, where  𝑋 ∈ (= 0, = 1, = 2, = 3, > 3) and 𝑌 ∈ (< −1, =
−1, = 0, = 1, > 1). Each coefficient 𝛾𝑋,𝑌 addresses the question of how the response for firms 
moving from having X directors to having X+Y directors varies for funds with different GIk 
values.25 The results presented in Table 7 suggest that the effects of gender bias manifest primarily 
when firms either go from having one to two directors, or from having three to four. The 
importance of the transition from one to two directors is consistent with the potential for a single 
token female director to be discounted by gender-biased investors, while the transition from three 
to four is consistent with gender-biased investors becoming concerned when female directors may 
form a bloc of more than three directors (Van Peteghem et al., 2018). 
 Table 8 examines effect heterogeneity across four classes of potential mechanisms. First, 
gender biases may affect investment decisions because fund managers expect female directors to 
have different preferences and thus make different decisions. Second, a low fraction of women in 
professional roles in a fund’s home country might reduce fund managers’ expectations of the 
efficacy of female directors. This perceived efficacy can be low because women are 
underrepresented in fund management (Sargis and Lutton, 2016), corporate directorships, or 
professional roles more generally. Third, fund managers may hold sexist attitudes about men or 
women in general. Sexist attitudes may be hostile (e.g., women seek special favors) or benevolent 
(e.g., women should be rescued first in a disaster), and different types of attitudes might 
differentially affect fund managers’ choices, with benevolence potentially leading to over-
                                                 
 
25 Regressions of FRACHELD_dif on changes in the number of male directors, interacted with GI, are 
available from the author. These regressions suggest that GI is associated with more positive reactions to 
increases in the number of male directors, potentially driven by negative reactions to firms that reduce the 
number of male directors by more than one. 
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investment in firms with more female directors.  Finally, geographic or linguistic distance might 
affect the degree to which fund managers can interact, bond, or relate to directors. More in-person 
interaction or a common language can facilitate fund managers’ learning about directors as 
individuals, reducing the likelihood of statistical discrimination facilitated by a lack of information 
on individual productivity or efficacy.  
Table 8 (in panels 8.A through 8.D) presents regression estimates of equation (2) 
supplemented with interactions between additional proxies and the variables of interest. The 
coefficients of interest are on the triple interaction, ∆Female directors * Gender Bias * Additional 
Proxy, where Gender Bias is either −GIk or FEMDIR_FPi,t-1, and Additional Proxy is an interaction 
variable discussed further below. All Additional Proxy variables are measured at the country or 
country-year level, and therefore capture fund managers’ beliefs of observations with noise. GI is 
included negatively to aid the interpretation of coefficients, i.e., so same-sign coefficients across 
Models can be interpreted similarly. In interpreting the coefficients on the triple interactions of 
interest, positive coefficients indicate stronger effects of gender bias on investment choices when 
the Additional Proxy is larger, while negative coefficients indicate weaker effects.  
 8.A tests the first channel related to fund managers extrapolating local differences in 
preferences between men and women, using measures from Falk and Hermle (2018). The measures 
include proxies for average country-level differences in altruism, trust, positive reciprocity, 
negative reciprocity, risk-taking, and patience, as well as a summary measure based on the first 
principal component of these (PrefDif). The survey-based individual preference measures capture 
the degree to which women in the country tend to display the preference more strongly, controlling 
for other individual-level features.  The principal component is associated with women displaying 
greater levels of altruism, trust, and positive reciprocity, and lower levels of negative reciprocity, 
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risk taking, and patience, relative to men.26 Models 1 and 2 use the principal component, PrefDif, 
while models 3 and 4 use interactions with each individual preference difference measure. In 
Models 1 and 2, the coefficient on the triple interaction, ∆Female directors * Gender Bias * 
PrefDif, is negative and significant at the five and one percent levels, respectively. This suggests 
that differences in preferences between men and women in the fund’s home country can influence 
the effects of gender biases on investment.  Specifically, the effects of gender bias on investment 
are greater when PrefDif is more negative, indicating women, relative to men, having more 
positive scores for negative reciprocity, risk taking, and patience, and more negative scores on 
altruism, trust, and positive reciprocity, on average. In Models 3 and 4, 10 out of the 12 interaction 
coefficients presented are not significant, and only interactions involving reciprocity in Model 4 
are positive and significant at the ten percent level. Overall, these results suggest that gender biases 
may influence investment choices because, based on local differences in preferences between men 
and women, fund managers might expect female directors to have different preferences from male 
directors, and this difference in preferences makes firms with more female directors less attractive. 
8.B examines the second channel, focusing on whether fund managers’ gender bias is 
related to the prevalence of women in various professions in the fund’s home country. I use the 
percent of home-country fund managers (Models 1 and 2), doctors (Models 3 and 4), and public-
firm directors (Models 5 and 6) who are female. In Model 2, the coefficient on the triple interaction 
is positive and significant, although the coefficient in Model 1 is near zero, providing mixed 
                                                 
 
26 Thanks to Johannes Hermle for sharing country-level proxies for differences in preferences. The 
measures used for the individual preference proxies are coefficients on a female indicator from country-
specific regressions of each individual-level survey-based proxy on the female indicator and controls for 
age, age squared, subjective math skills, education level, and household income quintile. See Falk and 
Hermle (2018) for further detail on the survey and the construction of country-level proxies. 
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support for the role of local female fund managers in driving the relation between gender biases 
and investment choices. It may be that men and women display similar implicit biases against 
female authorities (Rudman and Kilianski, 2000). Furthermore, gender biases against female 
portfolio managers in countries with greater gender inequality are a plausible mechanism 
consistent with the main hypotheses.  
In Models 3 and 4 of 8.B, the coefficients of interest are mixed. The coefficient on the 
triple interaction is negative (positive) and significant in Model 3 (4), implying that the prevalence 
of female medical professionals mitigates the effect of country-level biases on investment but is 
associated with a stronger degree of firm-level revealed preference biases influencing future 
investment choices. Model 6 suggests, based on the negative and significant coefficient on the 
triple interaction (p < 0.10), that familiarity with female directors, via the prevalence of local 
female directors, mitigates the degree to which gender biases influence investment choices. 
Interestingly, the regression estimates in 8.B suggest that female prevalence in investment 
management and medicine may tend to enhance the influence of gender biases on investment 
choices, while the presence of local female directors tends to reduce the influence of gender biases 
on investment. The result on female fund managers is particularly surprising as it contradicts the 
idea that female investors might be less gender-biased.  
 8.C focuses on the third mechanism involving country-level sexist attitudes. The 
regressions incorporate interactions with the country-average scores from the Hostile Sexism and 
Benevolent Sexism scales reported in Glick et al. (2000). Male scores are used because most fund 
managers are men (Sargis and Lutton, 2016), and the scores are included separately because Glick 
et al. (2000) report strong positive correlations between them. The interactions of interest are 
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positive and significant in Models 2 and 4, but insignificant in Models 1 and 2, providing modest, 
mixed evidence that sexist attitudes, whether hostile or benevolent, drive the main results. 
8.D presents results related to the fourth channel involving potential interaction and 
communication between fund managers and directors. Models 1 and 2, include interactions with 
Log Distance from U.S.. The coefficient of interest in Model 2 is positive and significant (p < 
0.05). The coefficient of interest in Model 1 is also positive, though not significant. In Models 3 
and 4, the Additional Proxy is commonality in the fund’s home-country language with the U.S. In 
Models 3 and 4, the coefficients on the interaction of interest are negative and significant at the 
five and one percent levels, respectively. Overall, 8.D suggests that gender biases manifest more 
strongly when the fund’s home country is geographically or linguistically farther from the U.S.  
Overall, the results from Table 8 suggest that gender biases may influence investment the 
most when women locally display broad differences in average preferences relative to men and 
investors (i.e., fund managers) are geographically and linguistically far from the U.S. These are 
consistent with fund managers extrapolating locally-formed views about women to female 
directors at U.S. companies with whom they have limited opportunities to interact or converse 
with frequently. There is also modest evidence that this potential extrapolation is weaker when 
more local board seats are held by women. This broadly consistent with statistical discrimination 
involving the extrapolation of group characteristics to group members when there is limited 
information about the efficacy or productivity of individuals. 
Note that the results presented so far are consistent both with funds from countries with 
high gender inequality biasing against firms with greater board gender diversity, and with funds 
from countries with low gender inequality biasing in favor. To examine whether either explanation 
dominates, the regressions in column 3 of Table 4 was re-estimated with FEMDIR_dif*GI replaced 
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by FEMDIR_dif*GI*1GI>0.1175 and FEMDIR_dif*GI*1GI<0.1175, where 1X is an indicator for 
condition X holding.27 In the re-estimation, only the coefficient for the low-inequality subsample, 
FEMDIR_dif*GI*1GI<0.1175, is not significantly different from zero (p = 0.75), while the coefficient 
for the high-inequality subsample, FEMDIR_dif*GI*1GI>0.1175, is negative and nearly significant 
at the ten percent level (𝛽 = −0.0371, 𝑆𝐸 = 0.0231, and p = 0.11). Overall, this result provides 
modest support for the effect of gender bias on portfolio choice being concentrated in countries 
with relatively high gender inequality, consistent with negative rather than positive gender bias. 
Additional robustness checks (available from the author) confirm that the results regarding 
portfolio tilting presented in Tables 4 and 5 are not attributable to several alternative explanations. 
Broadly, results are robust to using alternative gender bias proxies; using the average of GIk across 
all funds in a given fund family; including interactions between FEMDIR_dif and proxies for 
corruption, religiosity, economic development, the fraction of female directors in the fund’s home 
country; including interactions between GIk and proxies for firm size, leverage, corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) performance, or an indicator for CSR-related shareholder votes; using 
samples based on funds with different NHELD cutoffs; excluding any single country; clustering 
standard errors by country, firm, or country and firm, or fund and firm. Consistent with indexers 
or quasi-indexers being independent of gender biases, the main result does not hold for funds that 
hold 499 to 501 firms (i.e., funds that are likely to be mimicking the S&P 500).28 
                                                 
 
27 Because the GI is measured at the country-level, the sample split results in not-quite equal subsamples 
(1,578,142 observations with GI > 0.1175, and 1,279,864 observations with GI < 0.1175 for the Table 4 
sample). Additionally, the relevant value for median-splitting the sample used to estimate the regressions 
presented in Table 5 is also 0.1175. 
28 In additional analyses using changes in the number of shares rather than changes in portfolio allocation 




Using data on the U.S. holdings of non-U.S. funds, this paper provides evidence that gender 
bias is associated with portfolio choice in a manner consistent with a modest effect of investors’ 
gender biases on the stocks they hold. Regression results show that funds display gender-biased 
portfolio tilting: funds from countries with greater gender inequality tend to tilt their portfolios 
away from firms with a greater fraction of female directors on the board. The identification strategy 
relies on how the association between fund portfolio choices and firms’ board gender 
demographics varies with investors’ gender preferences inferred from their home country’s level 
of gender inequality. This strategy is not likely to be confounded by unobservable properties of 
firms, directors, or funds, which are likely to confound inferences that rely only on the average 
association between investor holdings and female directors. Additional results suggest statistical 
discrimination based on home-country differences between men and women as a plausible 
channel, enhanced by a lack of interpersonal interaction between fund managers and directors due 
to geographic and linguistic realities. 
The results are important in part because they imply that investor-level gender biases can 
contribute to a negative environment for female directors and executives, supporting the glass 
ceiling within firms, even though investors are external. Although several studies have suggested 
interventions to address bias within organizations (Joshi et al., 2015a; McDonald and Westphal, 
2013), addressing investor-level biases poses a significant problem beyond the firm’s control. 
Furthermore, investors from developing countries with greater gender inequality are becoming 
increasingly important in developed capital markets (Karolyi et al., 2015), suggesting a potentially 
increasing influence on firm valuations going forward. However, large asset managers in the U.S. 
and Western Europe have begun to incorporate positive biases into their portfolio strategies 
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This figure presents the fraction of fund-time observations in above-median (below-median) GI 
countries appearing in each decile of the sample-wide FEMDIR_FP distribution. GI is the UN 
Gender Inequality index. FEMDIR_FP is a revealed preference measure of the fund’s preference 
for female directors, defined as the value-weighted average fraction of female directors in the 
fund’s portfolio firms. Female Director Fund Preference (FEMDIR_FP), is a fund’s revealed 
preference for female directors for holdings reported at time t, defined as 𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑅_𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ 𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑗,𝑡∗𝐻𝐸𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑗,𝑡
∑ 𝐻𝐸𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑗,𝑡
 where i denotes fund, j denotes portfolio firm, t denotes time, FEMDIRj,t is 
the fraction of female directors on firm j at time t, and HELDi,j,t is the fund’s dollar-denominated 
holdings in firm j on time t. 
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SUM Min Max 
HELD DIR GI DIR KET HELD YEAR YEAR 
NETHERLANDS 60,263 0.03 0.14 0.05 0.73 10.92 1.16 23.78 0.17 48.05 17.71 1998 2011 
SWEDEN 132,363 0.03 0.14 0.05 0.73 11.24 1.1 23.99 0.11 55.67 16.95 1998 2011 
DENMARK 50,169 0.03 0.14 0.06 0.74 11.02 1.13 23.89 0.11 49.31 16.6 1998 2011 
SWITZERLAND 199,837 0.03 0.15 0.07 0.75 11.27 1.04 23.91 0.11 53.23 16.77 1998 2011 
FINLAND 20,527 0.04 0.14 0.08 0.74 11.08 1.11 23.86 0.09 36.69 16.32 1998 2011 
NORWAY 39,274 0.03 0.14 0.08 0.74 11.22 1.08 23.87 0.13 52.3 16.68 1998 2011 
GERMANY 460,389 0.03 0.14 0.09 0.72 11.34 1.09 24.05 0.14 47.16 16.63 1998 2011 
SINGAPORE 18,512 0.03 0.13 0.09 0.71 11.02 1.15 23.77 0.15 42.83 15.88 1998 2011 
ICELAND 1,143 0.03 0.12 0.1 0.68 10.86 1.27 23.95 0.19 35.52 16.31 2000 2008 
BELGIUM 79,123 0.03 0.14 0.11 0.73 11 1.09 23.72 0.12 52.09 16.72 1998 2011 
FRANCE 113,075 0.03 0.14 0.11 0.75 11.07 1.07 23.84 0.13 49.88 16.7 1998 2011 
ITALY 121,443 0.03 0.14 0.12 0.73 11.6 1.04 24.21 0.14 44.64 17.11 1998 2011 
JAPAN 47,758 0.02 0.14 0.12 0.73 11.31 1.05 23.95 0.14 56.92 16.53 1998 2011 
SPAIN 501,000 0.07 0.15 0.12 0.73 11.82 1.1 24.72 0.13 25.9 14.2 1998 2011 
AUSTRIA 71,987 0.02 0.14 0.13 0.73 11.4 1.08 23.97 0.12 52.25 15.98 1998 2011 
AUSTRALIA 61,719 0.03 0.13 0.14 0.72 10.96 0.99 23.74 0.07 51.14 14.82 1998 2011 
CANADA 372,661 0.02 0.13 0.14 0.73 10.99 1.07 23.61 0.15 51.69 17.28 1998 2011 
CYPRUS 228 0.02 0.16 0.14 0.77 11.45 0.98 24.26 0.06 52.51 13.4 2006 2009 
CZECH REPUBLIC 3,427 0.03 0.15 0.14 0.77 11.06 1.06 24.13 0.14 45.66 15.94 2001 2011 
PORTUGAL 29,386 0.02 0.14 0.14 0.74 11.2 1.09 23.88 0.17 56.35 15.99 1998 2011 
ISRAEL 15 0.03 0.01 0.15 0.62 6.53 3.34 20.55 -0.4 31.07 14.3 2001 2002 
GREECE 14,258 0.04 0.15 0.16 0.74 11.41 1.12 24.36 0.12 40.7 15.43 1998 2011 
POLAND 751 0.04 0.15 0.16 0.76 11.56 0.91 24.11 0.05 55.1 15.67 2001 2011 
LUXEMBOURG 146,897 0.03 0.13 0.17 0.71 11.25 1.1 23.87 0.14 50.07 16.02 1998 2011 
ESTONIA 3 0.22 0.35 0.19 0.87 7.67 1.31 20.36 0.29 3.33 13.97 2005 2006 
IRELAND  34,009 0.03 0.14 0.2 0.73 11.22 1.06 23.81 0.14 48.49 17.06 1998 2011 
NEW ZEALAND 5 0.04 0.05 0.2 0.47 10 0.48 21.31 -0.14 30 15.87 1999 1999 
UNITED KINGDOM 419,700 0.02 0.13 0.21 0.72 11.1 1.07 23.75 0.15 50.45 17.42 1998 2011 
HUNGARY 524 0.02 0.15 0.24 0.75 11.07 1.18 23.81 0.11 43.45 15.09 2001 2010 
MALTA 6 0.26 0.17 0.27 0.88 10.17 1.83 23.87 0.23 5 15.3 2011 2011 
BAHRAIN 50 0.03 0.17 0.29 0.82 11.52 0.91 24.16 -0.36 32.5 15.16 2009 2009 
MALAYSIA 418 0.1 0.17 0.29 0.83 11.76 1.11 24.35 0.19 21.76 14.97 2008 2011 
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO 358 0.02 0.18 0.33 0.83 11.81 1.03 24.44 0.22 42.15 16.82 2009 2011 
ARGENTINA 2,759 0.07 0.17 0.37 0.79 11.63 1.03 24.67 0.07 21.98 13.3 2000 2011 
CHILE 22,516 0.03 0.14 0.37 0.74 11.02 1.15 23.97 0.08 38.65 14.39 2000 2011 
PERU 62 0.16 0.13 0.42 0.64 12.65 1.24 25.14 -0.11 7.4 13.17 2000 2003 
PHILIPPINES 50 0.07 0.09 0.43 0.68 10.8 1.08 24.74 0.42 19.14 15.64 1999 2000 
BRAZIL 144 0.09 0.16 0.45 0.76 11.6 1.04 24.46 0.17 53.96 15.46 2001 2011 
MEXICO 6,697 0.07 0.17 0.45 0.8 12.2 1.05 25.11 0.1 26.45 16.46 2000 2011 
SOUTH AFRICA 13,166 0.05 0.12 0.49 0.69 10.99 1.23 23.85 0.16 37.78 16.24 1998 2011 
SWAZILAND 21 0.03 0.13 0.55 0.81 10.9 1.28 24.19 0.28 34.24 18.19 2007 2009 
INDIA 748 0.09 0.18 0.62 0.8 11.15 0.96 24.1 0.15 25.08 16.34 2000 2011 
This table presents the country-level number of fund-firm-time observations and means for select variables used in the study ordered 
by GI. FRACHELD is the value of fund i's holdings in firm j reported in the filing from date-t, divided by the sum of all holdings 
reported by fund i at date t, based on data from Thomson S12. FEMDIR is the fraction of female members of the board of directors. 
GI is the UN Gender Inequality Index from 2011. INDDIR is the fraction of independent members of the board of directors. NDIR 
is the number of directors on the firm’s board. FEMDIR, INDDIR, and NDIR are based on the most recent annual meeting preceding 
the fund’s reporting date. BETA is the CAPM beta from a regression of the firm’s returns on the CRSP value-weighted market 
portfolio using the 24 (at least 12) full months preceding the fund report date. MARKET is the log firm market value based on the 
fund’s filing. YMOM is momentum based on cumulative monthly security returns for the 12 months preceding the fund report date. 
NHELD is the number of firms reported on the fund’s filing. SUMHELD is the log of the total value of all reported holdings for 





TABLE 1.B: COUNTRY-LEVEL MEANS AND MEDIANS, AND CORRELATIONS OF COUNTRY-
LEVEL MEANS 
Variable FRACHELD FEMDIR GI INDDIR MEANAGE NDIR BOOK BETA DIVY MARKET ILLIQ QMOM1 YMOM RETVAR TURN NHELD SUMHELD 
Number (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
Mean of means 0.050 0.145 0.215 0.741 60.295 11.043 8.934 1.150 0.016 23.858 -9.235 0.024 0.110 0.015 0.606 39.966 15.876 
Std. dev of means 0.051 0.044 0.148 0.068 1.568 1.008 0.869 0.387 0.007 0.953 1.105 0.037 0.142 0.014 0.174 14.449 1.197 
Mean of medians 0.028 0.141 0.215 0.763 60.528 10.893 8.980 1.044 0.013 23.909 -9.292 0.020 0.068 0.009 0.435 38.012 15.910 
Std. dev of medians 0.038 0.047 0.148 0.077 1.817 1.039 0.906 0.432 0.009 0.996 1.111 0.043 0.133 0.013 0.117 14.490 1.237 
(1) 1.000 0.278 0.378 0.167 -0.165 0.102 0.351 0.131 -0.037 0.290 -0.256 -0.017 0.099 -0.093 -0.201 -0.668 -0.428 
(2) 0.510 1.000 0.170 0.880 0.656 0.503 0.588 -0.311 0.497 0.378 -0.590 0.017 0.050 -0.638 0.021 -0.110 -0.186 
(3) 0.326 0.091 1.000 0.279 0.194 0.113 0.391 -0.088 0.045 0.345 -0.356 -0.155 0.153 -0.308 0.045 -0.497 -0.327 
(4) 0.366 0.761 0.204 1.000 0.773 0.296 0.516 -0.190 0.364 0.322 -0.602 0.102 0.143 -0.647 0.245 -0.102 -0.093 
(5) -0.054 0.449 0.199 0.680 1.000 0.402 0.548 -0.398 0.526 0.380 -0.645 0.029 0.012 -0.567 0.385 0.059 0.083 
(6) -0.216 0.054 0.149 0.144 0.757 1.000 0.718 -0.431 0.531 0.719 -0.654 -0.428 -0.259 -0.408 -0.290 0.143 -0.103 
(7) -0.067 -0.107 0.270 0.182 0.711 0.888 1.000 -0.258 0.316 0.899 -0.901 -0.292 -0.060 -0.357 -0.071 -0.234 -0.299 
(8) 0.196 -0.290 -0.032 -0.031 -0.591 -0.698 -0.465 1.000 -0.752 -0.221 0.188 0.305 0.309 0.642 0.277 -0.341 -0.103 
(9) -0.195 -0.070 0.005 -0.319 0.079 0.233 0.188 -0.622 1.000 0.252 -0.338 -0.286 -0.323 -0.681 -0.091 0.130 -0.014 
(10) -0.138 0.011 0.254 0.286 0.763 0.913 0.913 -0.446 -0.085 1.000 -0.862 -0.272 -0.012 -0.328 -0.162 -0.203 -0.220 
(11) 0.142 -0.077 -0.239 -0.440 -0.827 -0.853 -0.887 0.352 0.150 -0.968 1.000 0.182 0.031 0.461 -0.103 0.215 0.239 
(12) 0.098 0.335 0.017 0.410 0.191 -0.136 -0.167 0.036 -0.414 0.000 -0.088 1.000 0.555 0.144 0.100 -0.035 0.396 
(13) 0.173 0.413 0.115 0.385 0.422 0.226 0.153 -0.337 -0.226 0.307 -0.315 0.747 1.000 0.166 0.143 -0.129 0.333 
(14) -0.018 -0.527 -0.090 -0.325 -0.741 -0.687 -0.489 0.932 -0.440 -0.500 0.454 -0.165 -0.498 1.000 0.205 -0.017 0.091 
(15) -0.176 -0.294 -0.001 0.183 -0.156 -0.390 -0.187 0.771 -0.512 -0.148 -0.010 -0.006 -0.378 0.732 1.000 -0.163 0.107 
(16) -0.787 -0.254 -0.493 -0.151 0.169 0.256 0.071 -0.252 0.058 0.147 -0.186 0.068 0.016 -0.141 0.009 1.000 0.425 
(17) -0.428 -0.145 -0.156 0.002 0.183 0.148 0.065 -0.207 0.023 0.101 -0.128 0.435 0.342 -0.171 0.012 0.500 1.000 
This table presents the mean, standard deviation, and Pearson correlations for the country-level means and medians of the main variables used in the study. All statistics are calculated 
based on 42 country-level observations. Pearson correlations between country-level means are in the bottom left, and Pearson correlations between country-level medians are in the 
top right of the correlation matrix. Bold correlations are significantly different from zero at the 1% level. Correlation coefficients in the table with absolute value greater than 0.393, 
0.305, and 0.257 are significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The unit of observation is country, based on either means or medians of 




TABLE 2.A: FUND-TIME DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
 Mean 0.14 0.13 45.00 66.00 51.00 55.00 54.00 65.00 4.36 5.40 0.08 0.28 51.22 0.38 8.42 377.03 0.66 16.41 10.36 
  Standard Deviation 0.05 0.06 13.00 15.00 17.00 17.00 13.00 21.00 0.65 0.71 0.03 0.18 74.32 0.19 0.83 183.81 0.06 1.18 0.46 
(1) FEMDIR FP 1.00 -0.05 0.14 -0.18 -0.11 -0.04 -0.10 0.17 -0.17 -0.19 0.19 -0.17 -0.15 -0.17 -0.01 -0.17 -0.18 -0.14 0.20 
(2) GI -0.03 1.00 0.16 0.25 0.20 -0.44 0.36 -0.16 -0.01 0.28 -0.14 0.23 0.11 0.26 -0.56 0.12 0.39 0.41 -0.06 
(3) Power Distance 0.14 0.11 1.00 -0.54 -0.46 -0.26 -0.35 0.78 -0.62 -0.64 0.51 -0.52 -0.39 -0.71 -0.22 -0.45 -0.55 -0.08 -0.40 
(4) Individuality -0.15 0.09 -0.58 1.00 0.43 0.01 0.64 -0.77 0.49 0.57 -0.15 0.67 0.74 0.78 -0.22 0.44 0.59 0.58 0.32 
(5) Masculinity -0.06 0.27 -0.24 0.27 1.00 0.47 -0.02 -0.32 0.07 0.45 -0.65 0.44 0.35 0.37 0.17 0.50 0.33 0.43 0.20 
(6) Long-term Orientation -0.02 -0.40 -0.12 -0.01 0.41 1.00 -0.37 0.04 -0.05 0.10 -0.38 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.55 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.23 
(7) Indulgence/Restraint -0.12 0.31 -0.49 0.57 -0.08 -0.39 1.00 -0.66 0.45 0.32 0.01 0.53 0.44 0.64 -0.32 0.13 0.69 0.18 0.31 
(8) Uncertainty Avoidance 0.15 -0.12 0.73 -0.71 -0.07 0.14 -0.72 1.00 -0.69 -0.68 0.29 -0.75 -0.67 -0.88 0.15 -0.52 -0.67 -0.40 -0.35 
(9) Corruption -0.12 -0.27 -0.67 0.38 -0.18 -0.06 0.53 -0.59 1.00 0.71 -0.37 0.58 0.48 0.69 -0.09 0.51 0.50 0.38 0.35 
(10) Religion in politics -0.14 0.20 -0.56 0.40 0.34 -0.02 0.27 -0.50 0.42 1.00 -0.51 0.60 0.52 0.70 -0.03 0.66 0.49 0.51 0.25 
(11) Local female director fraction 0.10 -0.15 0.40 -0.13 -0.61 -0.27 -0.06 0.10 -0.21 -0.34 1.00 -0.44 -0.21 -0.42 -0.12 -0.33 -0.30 -0.33 -0.13 
(12) Local directors from U.S. -0.13 0.26 -0.35 0.57 0.27 -0.29 0.64 -0.58 0.37 0.37 -0.23 1.00 0.86 0.75 -0.38 0.55 0.67 0.69 0.28 
(13) Directors in U.S. -0.13 0.30 -0.32 0.66 0.20 -0.38 0.58 -0.58 0.43 0.47 -0.13 0.88 1.00 0.74 -0.43 0.46 0.61 0.75 0.12 
(14) Common language with U.S. -0.13 0.35 -0.55 0.78 0.27 -0.29 0.67 -0.79 0.41 0.49 -0.22 0.63 0.72 1.00 -0.34 0.34 0.59 0.54 0.29 
(15) Log distance from U.S. 0.08 -0.05 0.16 -0.35 0.01 0.40 -0.38 0.28 -0.39 -0.30 0.07 -0.79 -0.86 -0.35 1.00 0.18 -0.20 -0.49 0.11 
(16) Genetic distance from U.S. -0.04 0.43 0.11 -0.24 0.13 -0.05 0.07 -0.06 -0.18 0.06 0.08 0.12 -0.02 -0.19 0.10 1.00 0.51 0.44 0.09 
(17) Religious distance from U.S. -0.09 0.27 -0.16 0.08 0.24 0.16 0.21 -0.36 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.26 0.13 0.18 0.13 0.67 1.00 0.37 0.27 
(18) Log trade with U.S. -0.13 0.17 -0.19 0.57 0.42 0.03 0.30 -0.39 0.29 0.42 -0.32 0.80 0.84 0.54 -0.71 -0.01 0.18 1.00 0.06 
(19) Log per capita GDP 0.14 -0.37 -0.44 0.35 0.08 0.23 0.24 -0.33 0.45 0.16 -0.03 0.15 0.08 0.20 -0.07 -0.32 -0.04 0.10 1.00 
(20) Net FDI as % of GDP 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.06 0.09 0.03 -0.12 
(21) Gini coefficient 0.03 0.73 0.35 -0.23 0.30 -0.34 -0.02 0.21 -0.44 0.03 -0.23 0.13 0.15 0.05 -0.01 0.46 0.12 0.13 -0.59 
(22) Log population 0.05 0.04 0.23 0.09 0.25 0.05 -0.32 0.12 -0.38 -0.06 0.04 0.11 0.19 0.09 -0.07 0.02 0.06 0.32 -0.46 
(23) Log migrants in U.S. -0.08 0.19 -0.15 0.44 0.42 -0.03 0.07 -0.30 -0.07 0.33 -0.14 0.58 0.63 0.49 -0.44 0.03 0.20 0.69 -0.26 
(24) Log migrants from U.S. -0.07 0.12 -0.16 0.46 0.34 -0.10 0.16 -0.33 0.08 0.29 -0.15 0.62 0.68 0.54 -0.50 -0.05 0.11 0.72 -0.23 
(25) Independent directors FP 0.41 0.01 0.08 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.06 -0.06 -0.08 0.17 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 0.35 
(26) Director age FP 0.27 0.03 0.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.07 0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.06 0.13 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.29 
(27) Book value FP 0.46 -0.05 0.23 -0.27 -0.10 -0.02 -0.22 0.26 -0.21 -0.19 0.11 -0.24 -0.24 -0.22 0.16 -0.05 -0.15 -0.22 0.01 
(28) CAPM Beta FP -0.27 -0.02 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 
(29) Dividend yield FP 0.34 0.03 0.09 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 0.07 -0.09 -0.10 0.10 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.14 
(30) Illiquidity FP -0.50 0.06 -0.26 0.31 0.12 0.02 0.25 -0.30 0.23 0.23 -0.13 0.28 0.27 0.26 -0.19 0.06 0.16 0.25 -0.05 
(31) Quarterly momentum FP -0.05 0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 
(32) Annual momentum FP -0.15 0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.02 
(33) Return variance FP -0.37 -0.01 -0.06 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.00 -0.03 0.05 0.06 -0.06 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.20 
(34) Share turnover FP -0.18 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.04 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.14 
(35) Stock price FP 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.01 
(36) Log fund's holdings -0.08 0.07 -0.38 0.49 0.18 0.07 0.39 -0.46 0.23 0.26 -0.06 0.41 0.38 0.38 -0.25 0.07 0.22 0.34 0.27 
(37) INVHELD 0.00 -0.01 0.20 -0.23 -0.09 -0.03 -0.19 0.22 -0.16 -0.13 0.07 -0.19 -0.19 -0.17 0.13 -0.03 -0.09 -0.15 -0.12 
(38) N. Directors FP 0.31 -0.01 0.12 -0.14 -0.05 -0.01 -0.12 0.14 -0.12 -0.10 0.01 -0.14 -0.13 -0.12 0.09 -0.02 -0.08 -0.12 -0.12 
(39) Market Value FP 0.44 -0.07 0.24 -0.30 -0.11 0.02 -0.27 0.29 -0.22 -0.20 0.05 -0.30 -0.29 -0.26 0.20 -0.07 -0.16 -0.25 -0.13 
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 Table 2.A, continued (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) 
 Mean -1.72 33.29 17.13 11.94 10.84 0.73 60.50 9.06 1.07 0.02 -9.79 0.03 0.15 0.01 0.55 122.02 15.34 0.15 11.54 24.44 
  Standard Deviation 11.99 3.48 1.25 1.49 1.35 0.10 2.54 1.45 0.51 0.01 1.30 0.15 0.40 0.01 0.39 1790.34 2.46 0.24 1.77 1.20 
(1) FEMDIR FP -0.01 0.07 0.06 -0.10 -0.09 0.44 0.30 0.47 -0.26 0.47 -0.48 -0.06 -0.12 -0.44 -0.12 0.02 -0.10 0.08 0.26 0.35 
(2) Gender Bias 0.07 0.53 -0.02 0.39 0.33 0.01 0.02 -0.09 -0.03 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.11 -0.10 -0.04 -0.12 
(3) Power Distance 0.04 0.22 0.07 -0.11 -0.13 0.07 0.06 0.26 0.02 0.10 -0.28 -0.03 -0.05 -0.12 -0.06 -0.07 -0.38 0.28 0.11 0.26 
(4) Individuality 0.03 -0.09 0.00 0.49 0.46 -0.05 -0.03 -0.35 -0.05 -0.08 0.38 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.54 -0.38 -0.17 -0.38 
(5) Masculinity 0.05 0.12 0.30 0.36 0.31 -0.04 -0.03 -0.22 -0.02 -0.06 0.24 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.34 -0.24 -0.08 -0.23 
(6) Long-term Orientation -0.10 -0.36 0.36 -0.12 -0.17 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 0.01 -0.06 0.07 -0.01 0.02 0.07 -0.01 0.06 0.12 -0.08 0.00 -0.02 
(7) Indulgence/Restraint -0.05 -0.01 -0.46 0.09 0.16 0.01 0.03 -0.23 -0.05 -0.02 0.24 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.35 -0.28 -0.12 -0.28 
(8) Uncertainty Avoidance -0.01 0.09 0.12 -0.38 -0.38 0.06 0.04 0.33 0.03 0.09 -0.35 -0.06 -0.06 -0.12 -0.10 -0.06 -0.49 0.34 0.15 0.35 
(9) Corruption 0.07 -0.31 -0.34 0.20 0.25 -0.08 -0.06 -0.30 -0.01 -0.12 0.32 0.03 0.04 0.12 0.08 0.02 0.34 -0.28 -0.15 -0.30 
(10) Religion in politics 0.16 -0.05 0.03 0.41 0.38 -0.10 -0.08 -0.33 -0.02 -0.13 0.35 0.04 0.05 0.15 0.07 0.05 0.41 -0.32 -0.14 -0.32 
(11) Local female director fraction 0.06 -0.01 -0.07 -0.17 -0.21 0.21 0.18 0.23 -0.01 0.18 -0.26 0.01 -0.03 -0.17 0.04 -0.07 -0.17 0.18 0.05 0.14 
(12) Local directors from U.S. 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.64 0.69 -0.03 -0.01 -0.32 -0.02 -0.09 0.34 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.04 0.46 -0.31 -0.17 -0.36 
(13) Directors in U.S. 0.07 0.06 0.28 0.76 0.83 -0.03 -0.01 -0.29 -0.02 -0.09 0.31 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.03 0.41 -0.26 -0.16 -0.33 
(14) Common language with U.S. 0.03 -0.04 -0.06 0.47 0.53 -0.07 -0.04 -0.31 -0.03 -0.09 0.34 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.43 -0.31 -0.15 -0.33 
(15) Log distance from U.S. 0.06 -0.49 -0.05 -0.57 -0.62 -0.03 -0.05 0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.04 
(16) Genetic distance from U.S. 0.23 -0.02 0.07 0.48 0.36 -0.05 -0.04 -0.29 -0.02 -0.10 0.32 0.04 0.05 0.12 0.10 0.04 0.40 -0.29 -0.14 -0.31 
(17) Religious distance from U.S. 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.37 0.40 -0.05 -0.03 -0.33 -0.04 -0.09 0.35 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.43 -0.33 -0.16 -0.36 
(18) Log trade with U.S. 0.09 0.16 0.41 0.81 0.81 -0.05 -0.03 -0.25 -0.01 -0.07 0.27 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.34 -0.21 -0.12 -0.26 
(19) Log per capita GDP -0.15 -0.35 -0.24 -0.18 -0.15 0.46 0.39 -0.02 -0.02 0.22 -0.05 0.05 0.08 -0.31 0.30 0.07 0.32 -0.18 -0.18 -0.22 
(20) Net FDI as % of GDP 1.00 0.24 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.07 0.02 -0.10 0.17 0.08 -0.06 0.04 -0.03 0.01 -0.06 
(21) Gini coefficient 0.05 1.00 0.41 0.38 0.41 0.11 0.03 0.14 0.05 0.00 -0.14 -0.02 0.03 0.13 0.10 -0.01 -0.17 0.20 0.03 0.10 
(22) Log population 0.12 0.34 1.00 0.56 0.55 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.02 0.03 -0.11 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.04 0.00 -0.07 0.14 0.02 0.07 
(23) Log migrants in U.S. 0.12 0.30 0.79 1.00 0.89 -0.02 0.00 -0.17 0.00 -0.05 0.18 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.27 -0.13 -0.09 -0.19 
(24) Log migrants from U.S. 0.11 0.34 0.78 0.92 1.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.15 0.00 -0.05 0.16 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.06 -0.01 0.18 -0.08 -0.09 -0.18 
(25) Independent directors FP -0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 1.00 0.61 0.28 -0.09 0.43 -0.33 0.02 -0.03 -0.38 0.28 0.03 0.01 0.08 -0.07 -0.01 
(26) Director age FP -0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.54 1.00 0.28 -0.26 0.51 -0.26 0.00 0.01 -0.46 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.18 0.02 
(27) Book value FP 0.00 0.08 0.09 -0.11 -0.10 0.31 0.31 1.00 -0.14 0.41 -0.83 -0.08 -0.14 -0.36 -0.27 0.03 -0.31 0.26 0.50 0.81 
(28) CAPM Beta FP 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.13 -0.36 -0.18 1.00 -0.41 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.47 0.47 -0.09 -0.05 0.07 -0.38 -0.13 
(29) Dividend yield FP 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.32 0.41 0.29 -0.34 1.00 -0.34 0.00 -0.10 -0.56 -0.31 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.39 0.23 
(30) Illiquidity FP 0.02 -0.07 -0.09 0.13 0.12 -0.33 -0.27 -0.79 0.11 -0.23 1.00 0.02 -0.05 0.43 0.13 -0.16 0.28 -0.23 -0.32 -0.83 
(31) Quarterly momentum FP 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.00 1.00 0.36 0.03 0.00 0.23 0.10 -0.08 -0.09 -0.02 
(32) Annual momentum FP -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.14 -0.11 -0.13 0.07 -0.15 -0.05 0.37 1.00 -0.05 0.00 0.50 0.16 -0.11 -0.16 0.00 
(33) Return variance FP 0.04 0.11 0.00 0.04 0.03 -0.27 -0.46 -0.33 0.65 -0.34 0.34 0.00 0.09 1.00 0.35 -0.14 0.05 -0.07 -0.21 -0.26 
(34) Share turnover FP 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.15 -0.07 -0.19 0.51 -0.18 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.47 1.00 -0.07 0.12 -0.04 -0.57 -0.44 
(35) Stock price FP 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.05 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 1.00 0.21 -0.21 0.03 0.21 
(36) Log fund's holdings 0.01 -0.15 -0.09 0.23 0.17 0.02 0.06 -0.21 -0.09 -0.04 0.19 0.08 0.13 -0.06 0.03 0.01 1.00 -0.64 -0.12 -0.30 
(37) INVHELD 0.01 0.13 0.11 -0.05 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.11 0.11 0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.08 0.09 0.07 0.01 -0.53 1.00 0.03 0.20 
(38) N. Directors FP 0.01 0.05 0.03 -0.07 -0.07 0.02 0.30 0.50 -0.39 0.31 -0.39 -0.04 -0.16 -0.31 -0.39 -0.02 -0.10 0.00 1.00 0.53 
(39) Market Value FP -0.01 0.07 0.07 -0.14 -0.13 0.09 0.14 0.78 -0.19 0.19 -0.89 0.01 0.05 -0.31 -0.33 0.01 -0.20 0.02 0.55 1.00 
Means and standard deviations for sample used in fund-time revealed preference tests.  N = 156,520, but many variables have missing data. Pearson (Spearman) correlations in 
bottom left (top right). All correlations except those highlighted in gray are significant at the 0.01 level. Variable definitions can be found in the text. 
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TABLE 2.B: FUND-FIRM-TIME-CHANGES DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 Mean 0.004 0.005 0.049 0.015 0.307 0.084 0.014 -0.001 0.001 -0.100 0.028 0.051 0.095 0.133 0.020 -0.036 
 Standard Deviation 0.056 0.040 0.452 0.074 1.325 0.300 0.466 0.011 0.011 0.550 0.198 0.291 0.410 0.541 0.335 1.140 
  N (millions) 2.445 2.164 2.164 2.164 2.164 2.072 2.159 2.160 2.158 2.162 3.044 3.044 3.042 3.039 2.162 2.164 
(1) FRACHELD_dif 1.000 0.005 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.037 -0.033 -0.043 -0.030 -0.082 0.117 0.124 0.107 0.101 -0.020 0.004 
(2) FEMDIR_dif 0.005 1.000 0.701 0.141 -0.051 0.052 0.013 -0.031 0.012 -0.067 0.003 -0.001 0.005 -0.002 0.023 -0.033 
(3) #FEMDIR_dif 0.006 0.892 1.000 0.107 -0.085 0.066 -0.012 -0.033 0.002 -0.036 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 0.004 0.040 0.311 
(4) INDDIR_dif 0.006 0.141 0.131 1.000 0.118 0.120 0.016 -0.024 0.022 -0.099 0.016 0.004 -0.005 -0.026 0.055 0.091 
(5) MEANAGE_dif 0.010 -0.051 -0.085 0.103 1.000 0.156 -0.020 -0.098 0.042 -0.103 0.028 0.036 0.025 0.017 0.023 0.004 
(6) BOOK_dif 0.031 0.052 0.066 0.069 0.156 1.000 -0.009 -0.110 -0.085 -0.258 0.033 0.126 0.091 0.114 -0.016 0.067 
(7) BETA_dif -0.013 -0.006 -0.012 0.015 -0.006 0.004 1.000 0.427 -0.025 0.097 -0.040 -0.057 -0.090 -0.079 0.082 -0.037 
(8) RETVAR_dif -0.020 -0.031 -0.033 -0.018 -0.043 -0.094 0.350 1.000 -0.005 0.220 -0.063 -0.002 -0.176 -0.177 0.209 -0.011 
(9) DIVY_dif -0.005 0.012 0.002 0.036 0.042 -0.085 -0.025 -0.005 1.000 0.034 0.008 -0.137 -0.236 -0.340 0.027 -0.047 
(10) ILLIQ_dif -0.055 -0.067 -0.036 -0.057 -0.103 -0.258 0.089 0.238 0.034 1.000 -0.207 -0.396 -0.426 -0.354 -0.013 0.009 
(11) QMOM1_dif 0.032 -0.004 -0.005 0.019 0.028 0.000 -0.040 -0.063 -0.015 -0.227 1.000 0.627 0.486 0.374 -0.066 -0.005 
(12) QMOM2_dif 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.036 0.055 -0.057 -0.002 -0.137 -0.424 0.627 1.000 0.779 0.642 -0.132 0.003 
(13) QMOM3_dif 0.034 0.002 0.003 -0.003 0.025 0.091 -0.090 -0.176 -0.236 -0.426 0.491 0.769 1.000 0.828 -0.147 0.001 
(14) YMOM_dif 0.031 0.003 0.006 -0.026 0.008 0.194 -0.046 -0.040 -0.340 -0.342 0.376 0.643 0.822 1.000 -0.092 0.011 
(15) TURN_dif 0.008 0.030 0.025 0.055 0.017 -0.016 0.148 0.209 0.058 -0.036 -0.188 -0.224 -0.187 -0.129 1.000 0.008 
(16) NDIR_dif 0.004 -0.033 0.320 0.091 0.004 0.095 -0.051 -0.043 -0.026 -0.006 -0.015 -0.009 -0.013 0.003 -0.010 1.000 
This table presents the mean, standard deviation, and number of observations (in millions) for the main variables used in the changes analysis as well as the Pearson 
and Spearman correlations between them. Pearson correlations are in the bottom left, and Spearman correlations are in the top right of the correlation matrix. All 
correlations except those highlighted in gray are significant at the 0.01 level. The unit of observation is the fund-firm pair reported on one of the fund’s filings, and 
the sample is based on the intersection of filings with NHELD < 101 and GI available. FRACHELD is the value of fund i's holdings in firm j reported in the filing 
from date-t, divided by the sum of all holdings reported by fund i at date t, based on data from Thomson S12. FEMDIR is the fraction of female members of the 
board of directors. #FEMDIR is the number of female members of the board of directors. INDDIR is the fraction of independent members of the board of directors. 
MEANAGE is the average age of board members.  NDIR is the number of directors on the firm’s board. [#]FEMDIR, INDDIR, MEANAGE, and NDIR are based 
on the most recent annual meeting preceding the fund’s reporting date. BOOK is the log book value of common equity (Compustat item CEQQ) reported during 
the calendar quarter prior to the fund report date. BETA is the CAPM beta from a regression of the firm’s returns on the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio 
using the 24 (at least 12) full months preceding the fund report date. RETVAR is the variance of monthly returns for the 24 (at least 12) months preceding the fund 
report date. DIVY is the annual dividend yield based on the most recent 12 months before the fund report date. ILLIQ is the Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity, 
calculated as the mean daily log of the absolute ex-dividend return times 106 divided by dollar volume for the 3 months before the fund report. QMOM, QMOM2, 
QMOM3, and YMOM are momentum proxies based on cumulative monthly security returns for the three, six, nine, and 12  months preceding the fund report date, 
respectively. TURN is share turnover for a held firm in the 3 months prior to the filing. _dif denotes a difference in the preceding variable.
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TABLE 3: FUND-TIME REVEALED PREFERENCES FOR FEMALE 
DIRECTORS AND GENDER INEQUALITY 
 Female Director Fund Preference (FEMDIR_FP) 
Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
Parameter Estimate   Estimate   Estimate   Estimate   Estimate   
GI -0.0362 ** -0.0577 *** -0.0683 ** -0.0747 *** -0.0736 *** 
 (0.0176)  (0.0189)  (0.0279)  (0.0173)  (0.0248)  
PowerDistance     0.0001      
     (0.0003)      
Individuality     0.0000      
     (0.0002)      
Masculinity     0.0001      
     (0.0003)      
Long-termOrientation     -0.0002      
     (0.0002)      
Indulgence     0.0002      
     (0.0003)      
UncertaintyAvoidance     0.0000      
     (0.0001)      
Corruption       0.0011 *   
       (0.0006)    
Religion in politics       -0.0014 ***   
       (0.0005)    
Local female director fraction         -0.0088  
         (0.0133)  
Local directors from U.S.         0.0029  
         (0.0052)  
Directors in U.S.         0.0000  
         (0.0000)  
Common language with U.S.   0.0026  0.0174  -0.0004  -0.0063  
   (0.0115)  (0.0472)  (0.0095)  (0.0135)  
Log distance from U.S.   0.0155 ** 0.0037  0.0239 *** 0.0220 ** 
   (0.0071)  (0.0279)  (0.0061)  (0.0097)  
Genetic distance from U.S.   0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 ** 0.0000  
   (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Religious distance from U.S.   -0.0230 * -0.0166  -0.0467 *** -0.0159  
   (0.0112)  (0.0305)  (0.0117)  (0.0143)  
Log trade with U.S.   0.0026 *** 0.0040  0.0016 * 0.0023 ** 
   (0.0009)  (0.0037)  (0.0009)  (0.0009)  
Log per capita GDP   -0.0042 * -0.0027  -0.0040 * -0.0061 ** 
   (0.0024)  (0.0035)  (0.0023)  (0.0024)  
Net FDI as % of GDP   -0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
   (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  
Gini coefficient   0.0010 *** 0.0012 *** 0.0010 *** 0.0008 ** 
   (0.0003)  (0.0004)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  
Log population   0.0039 *** 0.0062  0.0052 *** 0.0047 *** 
   (0.0010)  (0.0038)  (0.0012)  (0.0014)  
Log migrants in U.S.   -0.0038 *** -0.0036 *** -0.0037 *** -0.0043 *** 
   (0.0008)  (0.0012)  (0.0008)  (0.0012)  
Log migrants from U.S.   -0.0078 *** -0.0117 *** -0.0086 *** -0.0078 *** 
   (0.0015)  (0.0026)  (0.0014)  (0.0017)  
Independent directors FP   0.0881 *** 0.0882 *** 0.0882 *** 0.0791 *** 
   (0.0142)  (0.0142)  (0.0142)  (0.0151)  
Director age FP   -0.0059 *** -0.0058 *** -0.0059 *** -0.0055 *** 
   (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0004)  
Book value FP   -0.0036 *** -0.0036 *** -0.0036 *** -0.0039 *** 
   (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0008)  (0.0009)  
CAPM Beta FP   -0.0082 ** -0.0082 ** -0.0082 ** -0.0067 ** 
   (0.0033)  (0.0033)  (0.0033)  (0.0030)  
Dividend yield FP   0.2541 *** 0.2542 *** 0.2537 *** 0.2100  
   (0.0916)  (0.0915)  (0.0915)  (0.1285)  
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Illiquidity FP   0.0026  0.0027  0.0026  0.0040  
   (0.0042)  (0.0042)  (0.0042)  (0.0050)  
Quarterly momentum FP   -0.0071  -0.0072  -0.0071  -0.0080  
   (0.0047)  (0.0046)  (0.0047)  (0.0048)  
Annual momentum FP   -0.0111 *** -0.0111 *** -0.0111 *** -0.0098 *** 
   (0.0011)  (0.0012)  (0.0012)  (0.0011)  
Return variance FP   -0.0870  -0.0875  -0.0867  -0.1144  
   (0.1042)  (0.1043)  (0.1044)  (0.1193)  
Share turnover FP   -0.0118 *** -0.0117 *** -0.0118 *** -0.0109 *** 
   (0.0027)  (0.0027)  (0.0027)  (0.0037)  
Stock price FP   0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
   (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Log fund's holdings   -0.0004 * -0.0004 ** -0.0004 * -0.0004 * 
   (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Legal System and Continent FE No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country-clustered standard errors Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
INVHELD, NDIR FP, and MARKET 
FP linear, squared and cubic terms  
included No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N           156,520            69,161            69,153            69,161            60,581   
R2 0.1616   0.3874   0.3876   0.3875   0.3707   
 Standard errors clustered by fund are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: The dependent 
variable, Female Director Fund Preference (FP), is a fund’s revealed preference for female directors for holdings 
reported at time t, defined as 𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑅_𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ 𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑗,𝑡∗𝐻𝐸𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑗,𝑡
∑ 𝐻𝐸𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑗,𝑡
 where i denotes fund, j denotes portfolio firm, t 
denotes time, FEMDIRj,t is the fraction of female directors on firm j at time t, and HELDi,j,t is the fund’s dollar-
denominated holdings in firm j on time t.  Gender Bias is the UN Gender Inequality Index from 2011. Power Distance, 
Individuality, Masculinity, Long-term Orientation, Indulgence, and Uncertainty Avoidance are Hofstede’s six 
National Culture dimensions. Corruption is the country-level corruption index from the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG). Religion in politics is the country-level Religion in Politics index from ICRG. Local female director 
fraction is the country-year average fraction of female directors on boards of firms located in the fund’s home country, 
taken from Schmid and Urban (2013). Local directors from U.S. is the fraction of foreign directors of corporate boards 
in the fund’s home country who are from the United States, based on Barrios et al. (2017).  Directors in U.S. is the 
number of U.S. corporate directors from the fund’s home country reported in Barrios et al. (2017). Common language 
with U.S. is the linguistic commonality between the fund’s home country and the U.S., based on the Common 
Language measure reported in Melitz and Toubal (2014). Log distance from U.S. is the log of the geographic distance 
from the fund’s home country to the U.S., based on most populous cities, as provided by Melitz and Toubal (2014). 
Genetic distance from U.S. is the weighted FST genetic distance between the fund’s home country and the U.S. as 
provided by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013). Religious distance from U.S. is the Fearon weighted religious distance of 
the fund’s home country from the U.S. provided by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016). Log trade with U.S. is the log of 
total trade between the fund’s home country and the U.S. from 1998 to 2007, from Melitz and Toubal (2014). Log per 
capita GDP is the log of per capita GPD in U.S. dollars in the fund’s home country for the year, taken from the World 
Bank (WB). Net FDI as % of GDP is net foreign direct investment (inflows minus outflows) divided by GDP taken 
from the World Bank. The Gini coefficient and Log population are taken from the World Bank. Log migrants in U.S. 
is the log of the stock of migrants from the fund’s home country in the U.S. in 2010 taken from the United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. Log migrants from U.S. is the log of the stock of 
migrants in the fund’s home country from the U.S. in 2010 taken from the United Nations Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs, Population Division. Variables followed by FP indicate fund preferences for Independent 
directors, Director age, Book value, CAPM Beta, Dividend yield, Illiquidity, Quarterly momentum, Annual 
momentum, Return variance, Share turnover, Stock price, MARKET (Market value), and NDIR (Number of directors) 
are calculated as 
∑ 𝑋𝑗,𝑡∗𝐻𝐸𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑗
∑ 𝐻𝐸𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑗
 where Xj,t is the appropriate measure for the portfolio firm j at time t. Log fund’s 
holdings is the log of the reported holdings by the fund in dollars, and INVHELD is 1/NHELD, where NHELD is the 




TABLE 4: INVESTOR GENDER BIAS AND CHANGES IN THE 
FRACTION OF FEMALE DIRECTORS 
 Change in fraction of fund portfolio held in firm  











∆Female directors * GI -503.065 *** -486.168 *** -462.534 *** 
 (165.312)  (165.308)  (166.011)  
∆CAPM Beta * GI  
 
  -12.634  
     (17.168)  
∆Return variance * GI  
 
  -409.657  
     (929.791)  
∆Independent directors * GI  
 
  -94.959  
     (105.576)  
∆Director age * GI  
 
  2.972  
     (5.946)  
∆Female directors (FEMDIR_dif) 52.141 ** 50.895 ** 47.877 * 
 (25.475)  (25.467)  (25.556)  
∆Independent directors (INDDIR_dif) 8.345  8.791  20.84  
 (6.252)  (6.252)  (15.345)  
∆Director age (MEANAGE_dif) 0.213  0.279  -0.095  
 (0.401)  (0.402)  (0.896)  
∆Book value (BOOK_dif) 29.928 *** 30.249 *** 30.248 *** 
 (1.969)  (1.975)  (1.975)  
∆CAPM Beta (BETA_dif) -8.428 *** -8.386 *** -6.776 *** 
 (1.195)  (1.194)  (2.626)  
∆Return variance (RETVAR_dif) -384.020 *** -386.937 *** -335.557 ** 
 (65.498)  (65.489)  (143.145)  
∆Dividend yield (DIVY_dif) -229.349 *** -231.018 *** -231.029 *** 
 (36.148)  (36.149)  (36.150)  
∆Illiquidity (ILLIQ_dif) -35.993 *** -36.128 *** -36.129 *** 
 (1.277)  (1.279)  (1.279)  
Returns in the past 3 months (QMOM1) 80.302 *** 80.978 *** 80.963 *** 
 (3.447)  (3.451)  (3.451)  
Returns in the past 6 months (QMOM2) 15.044 *** 14.926 *** 14.932 *** 
 (3.055)  (3.050)  (3.049)  
Returns in the past 9 months (QMOM3) 5.156  5.081  5.086  
 (3.342)  (3.342)  (3.343)  
Returns in the past 12 months (YMOM) -6.579 *** -6.349 *** -6.353 *** 
 (2.439)  (2.439)  (2.439)  
∆Share turnover (TURN_dif) 16.065 *** 16.011 *** 16.01 *** 
 (2.145)  (2.144)  (2.144)  
∆Number of directors (NDIR_dif) -1.084 ** -1.067 ** -1.067 ** 
 (0.436)  (0.436)  (0.436)  
Gender Inequality (GI) -14.589 *** Absorbed  Absorbed  





Industry, Year-quarter, S&P Index FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country FE No  Yes  Yes  
Fund-clustered standard errors Yes  Yes  Yes  
N (millions of fund-firm-time observations) 2.035  2.035  2.035  
R2 (in basis points) 48.92   51.8   51.8   
Standard errors clustered by fund are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Coefficient estimates and standard errors are 
multiplied by 10,000 for presentation. Variables are defined in the notes to Table 2.B. 
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TABLE 5: REVEALED PREFERENCE GENDER BIAS AND CHANGES IN 
THE FRACTION OF FEMALE DIRECTORS 
 Change in fraction of fund portfolio held in firm  
Model (1)  (2)  (3)  
Parameter Estimate   Estimate   Estimate   
∆Female directors * lag(FEMDIR_FP) 0.269 *** 0.274 *** 0.282 *** 
 (0.063)  (0.063)  (0.064)  
∆CAPM Beta * lag(FEMDIR_FP)     0.017 *** 
     (0.005)  
∆Return variance * lag(FEMDIR_FP)     -1.088 *** 
     (0.194)  
∆Independent directors * lag(FEMDIR_FP)     -0.076 ** 
     (0.033)  
∆Director age * lag(FEMDIR_FP)     -0.001  
     (0.002)  
lag(FEMDIR_FP) 0.002  0.001  0.001  
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
∆Female directors (FEMDIR_dif) -0.042 *** -0.042 *** -0.043 *** 
 (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  
∆Independent directors (FEMDIR_dif) -0.001  -0.001  0.010 ** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.005)  
∆Director age (MEANAGE_dif) 0.000  0.000  0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
∆Book value (BOOK_dif) 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
∆CAPM Beta (BETA_dif) -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.003 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  
∆Return variance (RETVAR_dif) -0.046 *** -0.046 *** 0.106 *** 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.027)  
∆Dividend yield (DIVY_dif) -0.025 *** -0.025 *** -0.026 *** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
∆Illiquidity (ILLIQ_dif) -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Returns in the past 3 months (QMOM) 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Returns in the past 6 months (QMOM2) 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Returns in the past 9 months (QMOM3) 0.000  0.000  0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Returns in the past 12 months (YMOM) 0.000  0.000  0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
∆Share turnover (TURN_dif) 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
∆Number of directors (NDIR_dif) 0.000  0.000  0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Industry, Year-quarter, S&P Index FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country FE No  Yes  Yes  
Fund-clustered standard errors Yes  Yes  Yes  
N (millions of fund-firm-time observations)        1.97          1.97          1.97   
R2 (in basis points) 49.453   51.713   52.45   
Standard errors clustered by fund are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Coefficient estimates and standard errors are 
multiplied by 10,000 for presentation. Variables are defined in the notes to Table 2.B. 
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TABLE 6: PREFERENCE FOR NUMBER OF DIRECTORS 
 Number of Female Directors Fund Preference (NFEMx_FP) 
Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  
NFEMx_FP, x = 0  1  2  3+  0  1  2  3+  
Parameter Estimate   Estimate   Estimate   Estimate   Estimate   Estimate   Estimate   Estimate   
Gender Bias 0.283 *** -0.005  -0.230 * -0.048          
 (0.100)  (0.139)  (0.124)  (0.094)          
lag(FEMDIR_FP)         -1.065 *** -1.438 *** 0.474 *** 2.029 *** 
         (0.040)  (0.058)  (0.059)  (0.044)                   
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Legal System and Continent FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Fund-clustered standard errors Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
MARKET_FP, INVHELD, and NDIR_FP  
linear, squared and cubic terms included Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Controls from Table 3, Model 2 Included Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N     69,161       69,161       69,161       69,161       61,735       61,735       61,735       61,735   
R2 0.452   0.182   0.175   0.368   0.514   0.244   0.176   0.484   
Standard errors clustered by fund are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent 
levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: The dependent variable, Number of Female Directors Fund Preference (NFEMx_FP), is a fund’s revealed 
preference for firms with 0, 1, 2, or 3+ female directors for holdings reported at time t, defined as 𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑀𝑥_𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ 1𝑁𝐹𝐸𝑀𝑗,𝑡=𝑥∗𝐻𝐸𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑗,𝑡
∑ 𝐻𝐸𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑗,𝑡
 where i denotes fund, j 
denotes portfolio firm, t denotes time, NFEMxj,t is the number of female directors on firm j at time t, and HELDi,j,t is the fund’s dollar-denominated holdings in 
firm j on time t.  Gender Bias is the UN Gender Inequality Index from 2011. Female Director Fund Preference (FEMDIR_FP), is a fund’s revealed preference for 
female directors for holdings reported at time t, defined as 𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑅_𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ 𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑗,𝑡∗𝐻𝐸𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑗,𝑡
∑ 𝐻𝐸𝐿𝐷𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑗,𝑡
 where i denotes fund, j denotes portfolio firm, t denotes time, 
FEMDIRj,t is the fraction of female directors on firm j at time t, and HELDi,j,t is the fund’s dollar-denominated holdings in firm j on time t.  All specifications 
include controls as in Table 3, Model 2, which are described in the note to Table 3.
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TABLE 7: GENDER BIAS AND CHANGES IN THE NUMBER OF FEMALE DIRECTORS 
 
 Coeff. Est. 
Std. Error 
% of Sample #FEMDIR_dif<-1 
  
#FEMDIR_dif=-1   #FEMDIR_dif=0   #FEMDIR_dif=1   #FEMDIR_dif>1   
lag(#FEMDIR)=0 N/A  N/A  Omitted Base   -0.005  -0.024  
 N/A  N/A  Category  (0.005)  (0.015)  
 0.0%  0.0%  9.5%  1.6%  0.3%  




















































-0.013 ** -0.009 
 








 0.2%  1.5%  11.0%  0.8%  0.0% 
 
lag(#FEMDIR)>3 -0.006  0.000 -0.002 0.010 -0.047 
 







  0.1%   0.7%   3.4%   0.1%   0.0%   
 
 
This table presents estimates of the coefficients of interest, 𝛾𝑋,𝑌, from an estimate of the following regression equation: 
𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝐻𝐸𝐿𝐷_𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = ∑ 𝛾𝑋,𝑌 ∗ 1#𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑗,𝑡−1𝑋 ∗ 1#𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑅_𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑗,𝑡𝑌 ∗ 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑘
𝑋,𝑌
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑍 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑍
𝑍
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 . 
This is the regression from Table 5, Column 3, but with FEMDIR_difj,t replaced with the product of indicators for lag(#FEMDIR)X and #FEMDIR_difY, where  
𝑋 ∈ (= 0, = 1, = 2, = 3, > 3) and 𝑌 ∈ (< −1, = −1, = 0, = 1, > 1). Coefficients marked with N/A are omitted because they are infeasible. The coefficient for 
(𝑋 = 0, 𝑌 = 0)  is treated as the omitted base case.   #FEMDIR(_dif) is the (change in) the number of female directors. Each cell shows the coefficient estimate on 
1𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑛 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 ∗ 1𝑅𝑜𝑤 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 ∗ 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑘, its standard error in parentheses, and the percent of the sample satisfying 1𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑛 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 ∗ 1𝑅𝑜𝑤 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 . Controls 
include each indicator and product of indicators. Additional controls from Table 5, Column 3 are also included, and are defined in the notes to Table 2.B. Standard 
errors clustered by fund are shown in parentheses below coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
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TABLE 8: EFFECT HETEROGENEITY 
8.A: Gender differences in preferences 
Model (1)  (2)   (3)  (4)  
Gender Bias Measure -GI  lag(FEMDIR_FP)   -GI  lag(FEMDIR_FP)  
Parameter Estimate   Estimate     Estimate   Estimate   














     


















∆Female directors * Gender Bias * PrefDif_PosRecip      -0.035 
 
0.146 *  




∆Female directors * Gender Bias * PrefDif_NegRecip      0.061 
 
0.203 *  






















          
All 2-way interaction terms Included  Included  
 Included  Included  
Controls and FE from Tables 4 & 5, Col. 2 Included  Included   Included  Included  
Standard Errors Clustered by  Fund  Fund   Fund  Fund  
N (millions of fund-firm-time observations) 1.811 1.752 1.811 1.752 
R2 (in basis points) 50.33   50.55     50.43   51.10   
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8.B: Local prevalence of women in various professions 
Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 (6)  
Gender Bias Measure -GI  lag(FEMDIR_FP)  -GI  lag(FEMDIR_FP)  -GI 
 lag(FEMDIR_FP)  
Parameter Estimate   Estimate   Estimate   Estimate   Estimate   Estimate   













∆Female directors * Gender Bias * %Fem Fund Mgrs. -0.002 
 





        
∆Female directors * Gender Bias * %Fem. Doctors     -0.071 *** 0.193 **  
    (0.023) 
 
(0.078) 
     
∆Female directors * Gender Bias * FracFemDirCY     
    
-0.008 
 
-0.103 *  
    





             
All 2-way interaction terms Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
Controls and FE from Tables 4 & 5, Col. 2 Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  
Standard Errors Clustered by  Fund  Fund  Fund  Fund  Fund  Fund  
N (millions of fund-firm-time observations) 1.939 1.876 1.622 1.569 1.865 1.806 
R2 (in basis points) 50.93   50.48   53.17   52.31   58.08   58.11   
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8.C: Hostile and Benevolent Sexism 
Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Gender Bias Measure -GI  lag(FEMDIR_FP)  -GI  lag(FEMDIR_FP)  
Parameter Estimate   Estimate   Estimate   Estimate   









∆Female directors * Gender Bias * Hostile Sexism 0.005 
 





    
∆Female directors * Gender Bias * Benevolent Sexism     0.002 
 0.311 ***  




                  
All 2-way interaction terms Included  Included  Included  Included  
Controls and FE from Table 4 & 5, Col. 2 Included  Included  Included  Included  
Standard Errors Clustered by  Fund  Fund  Fund  Fund  
N (millions of fund-firm-time observations) 1.216  1.180  1.216  1.180  
R2 (in basis points) 53.757   52.079   53.748   52.296   
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8.D: Geographic and linguistic distance 
Model (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Gender Bias Measure -GI  lag(FEMDIR_FP)  -GI  lag(FEMDIR_FP)  
Parameter Estimate   Estimate   Estimate   Estimate   
∆Female directors * Gender Bias 0.039 
 









∆Female directors * Gender Bias * Log Dist. from U.S.. 0.021 
 





    
∆Female directors * Gender Bias * Com. Lang. with U.S.     -0.044 ** -0.234 ***  




                  
All 2-way interaction terms Included  Included  Included  Included  
Controls and FE from Table 4 & 5, Col. 2 Included  Included  Included  Included  
Standard Errors Clustered by  Fund  Fund  Fund  Fund  
N (millions of fund-firm-time observations) 2.035 1.967 2.035 1.967 
R2 (in basis points) 51.77   51.76   51.82   52.09   
This table presents estimates of Model 2 from Tables 4 (odd-numbered columns) and 5 (even-numbered columns), with ∆Female directors * Gender Bias interacted 
with proxies for differences preferences between men and women (8.A), hostile and benevolent sexism attitudes (8.B), monitoring costs and fund market size (8.C), 
and the fraction of women in various professions (8.D). Each interactive variable is standardized to be mean-zero and unit-variance. Gender Bias is either the 
home-country Gender Inequality Index (GI) or FEMDIR_FPi,t-1, which captures the fund’s revealed preference for female directors on its last filing. PrefDif_X is 
a country-level measure from Falk and Hermle (2018) of the degree to which women in the fund’s home country exhibit greater X than men, where X is one of six 
preference measures: altruism, trust, positive reciprocity, negative reciprocity, risk taking, and patience. PrefDif is the first principal component from the six 
PrefDif_X measures. %Fem Fund Mgrs. and %Fem. Doctors are the percentage of fund managers and doctors, respectively, in the fund’s home country who are 
female, as reported by Sargis and Lutton (2016), Exhibit 1. FracFemDirCY is the country-year average fraction of female directors on boards of firms located in 
the fund’s home country, taken from Schmid and Urban (2013). Common language with U.S. is the linguistic commonality between the fund’s home country and 
the U.S., based on the Common Language measure reported in Melitz and Toubal (2014). Log distance from U.S. is the log of the geographic distance from the 
fund’s home country to the U.S., based on most populous cities, as provided by Melitz and Toubal (2014). Standard errors clustered by fund are shown in parentheses 
below coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. All specifications include the interactive 
variable (when not collinear with country fixed effects) and 2-way interactions, as well as the controls and fixed effects from Column 2 in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
  
